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1

Introduction
In 1981, a Japanese designer gave her debut of the first collections in Paris. That was the
first time that an “eastern” fashion designer brought her aesthetic into the fashion world that was
dominated by the “western”. Although the designer does not think that her work speaks for
eastern Asia aesthetics, the entry of her design into the western dominated empire revolutionized
people’s conception of fashion and beauty. The clothing she created looked bizarre to most
people at that time: monochrome dark garments, oversized silhouettes that do not conform to the
curves of the human body, asymmetrical shapes, and broken pieces as if ripped or burnt. It went
totally in the opposite direction of the contemporary fashion trend: exquisite sewing, harmonious
colors, and perfect cuts that subtly show the curve of the human body, etc. The majority of the
fashion world rejected her. However, forty years later, we can see that her ideas of clothing have
slipped into various fashion designs and the dairy wardrobes of many people. We see more and
more people start to wear clothing with deliberately made holes, raw edges, and exaggeratingly
oversized cuts. This designer is Rei Kawakubo, and her most influential brand is Comme des
Garçons. Today she has established a distinctive label of fashion with many faithful adherents,
and his aesthetics has been embraced by many new generations.
Kawakubo’s designs made people question the concept of beauty and its relationship to
the human body. Does beauty, as it manifests itself in the form of clothing, must appear as
exquisite embroideries, fine cuts, harmonious color, and luxury materials? While the majority of
people recognize the beauty of the Eurocentric bourgeois dressing styles, it seems that the very
anti-bourgeois styles are also becoming more and more prevailing. Hence, what features of the
beautiful things make people feel their beauty? Is there a common feature between these designs
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even though they appear to be so different? How these features “enhance” the beauty of the
people who wear these dresses? What is the relation between these specific features and the
concept of beauty? Moreover, if certain garments are not appealing to people’s eyes, does this
mean that they are ugly? Since we have seen the prevailing styles of dressing have been
changing a lot as time changes, does this mean that the standard of beauty is “cultivable”? In
this way, does the definition of beauty change correspondingly to the change of the standard of
beauty?
As the author of Fashion: A Philosophy, Lars Svendsen, says, “Clothes rewrite the body,
give it a different shape and a different expression.” We see how clothing gives us a different
perception of the beauty of people in the above example. Kawakubo’s radically different designs
made us reconsider the features and possibilities of beauty. Since her works of design that were
regarded to be ugly when first shown become a very influential brand now, it seems that ugly
could transform into beauty through a certain way. However, not all ugly could evolve into
beauty, it seems there are some rules that decide whether something could be beautiful.
Nevertheless, in reality, it is extremely difficult to find out the explicit rules or definition of
beauty. While an aesthetic judgment is made as if there are some rules restricting, beauty could
manifest itself in so many different forms with different features. The beautiful things really look
and sound different if we compare one with another closely.
In this article, we will discuss the possible definitions of beauty, the reason why beauty is
so difficult to define, and the issues of the very act of defining beauty. In this way, we can come
to a clearer view of the relationship between the idea of beauty, beautiful things, features of
beauty, and the occasion of beauty. We will look at Plato’s thoughts on absolute beauty in the
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Republic first, seeing how absolute beauty is distinguished from tangible beautiful things. Then
we will take a close look at Aristotle’s view on the beauty of poetic works and the process of
gaining knowledge. We will see how Aristotle brings the absolute idea closer to the experience
of a certain person and how his theories on beauty of poetry works could be identified in other
manifestations of beauty. Later we will shift the attention to the inner aspect of beauty, reading
Francis Hutcheson’s passage on the Internal Sense and the feature of objects that give rise to the
impression of beauty. Through some pictures of fashion design works, we will see how
Hutcheson’s formula of beauty could be applied to these beautiful objects and how these objects
show the limitations of this formula. The last philosopher of this essay will be Wittgenstein. We
will see his views on the problems existing in the action of defining words, the limitations of
language, as well as the primary function of the term beauty. Rei Kawakubo’s design works will
be used close to the end of this paper to exemplify and extend Wittgenstein’s theories.

4

Section 1. Plato’s Essentialistic View
In the Republic, Plato differentiates “many beautiful” from “the absolute beauty”. He
says,
“The lovers of sounds and sights, I replied, are, as I conceive, fond of fine tones and
colors and forms and all the artificial products that are made out of them, but their mind
is incapable of seeing or loving absolute beauty.”1
That is, people who love beautiful things are actually fond of the manifestations of beauty, e.g.
things that please the eyes and the ears. They do not necessarily know the concept of absolute
beauty since what they love is merely a pleasing sense. The absolute beauty, as he explains, is the
eternal and divine Form of beauty that is not accessible to the senses but the intelligence. While
the many beautiful things are beautiful within a certain context, absolute beauty remains
unchanging as it is about knowledge rather than an opinion. Those who could recognize the
existence of absolute beauty could distinguish the difference between the idea and the object (i.e.
the beautiful things) that participate in the idea. In contrast, the sensible beautiful things, as he
describes, would become ugly if the given environment becomes different. For example, a pair of
beautiful adult shoes would look good when worn by an adult and matched with certain
garments, but it would become disproportionate if worn by a child. A chord would sound great
within a certain phrase, but it would lose its magic if put in another piece of music. Hence, for
Plato, the sensible beautiful is relative and temporal. It remains as an opinion and could not enter
the realm of philosophy since it is not about truth and knowledge. The nonphilosophers who are
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lovers of beautiful things are incapable of knowing absolute beauty because while beautiful
things are about senses, absolute beauty is about intelligence. Just as those who see many just but
do not know absolute justice, the people that love fair colors and sweet sounds do not have the
true knowledge about absolute beauty. What they have toward the object that they love is merely
an opinion, and an opinion, in his view, is an intermediate between knowledge and ignorance.
Therefore, absolute beauty (i.e. the notion of beauty itself) is the object that philosophers
want to explore as it is more divine and eternal than the sensible beautiful things from a
philosophic point of view. Although absolute beauty could manifest itself through the beautiful
things which can be sensed by the organs, absolute beauty by itself could only be contemplated
through the intellectual mind. As Plato says, “The many, as we say, are seen but not known, and
the ideas are known but not seen.”2 We see that, for Plato, just as to know what redness is, one
should look at the color itself instead of a red pen or a red table, to know what beauty is one must
look for absolute beauty itself. However, the idea of beauty is unlike the color red-- although
redness manifests itself in a red pen, both the color red and the red pen are visible to the eyes; in
comparison, the notion of absolute beauty could only be perceived and inspected by the mind.
On the other hand, how could we know anything about beauty if we do not use our
senses? It seems that absolute beauty, although existing independently from the organic senses,
must derive from the sensory experience of the tangible things. To see a beautiful painting we
use our eyes, to hear a beautiful piece of music we use our ears, and it is through these beautiful
pieces and paintings that touch us and shed our tears, we come to understand what an object that
could arouse a sense of beauty inside us is like. A vague feeling of the notion of beauty is
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formed, but on the other hand, it is difficult to say what exactly the notion by itself is if
discussing without the sensory experience.
It seems that Plato has a mixed feeling of the role of sense in the formation of the concept
of beauty. On the one hand, he negates the possibility of accessing absolute beauty through
various senses since the tangible beautiful things are relative and changing. Remaining in the
realm of sensory experience would never render the ideal about the form of beauty. On the other
hand, he sees that the concept of beauty does not come out of nowhere; between the absolute
idea and the sensory experience of beautiful things, there seems to be something that connects
them.
Plato admits the role of senses in the process of knowing the idea of beauty, and he
explains this connection by an essentialistic view. He says,
“...there is an absolute beauty and an absolute good, and of other things to which the
term ‘many’ is applied there is an absolute; for they may be brought under a single idea,
which is called the essence of each.”3
He uses the sun as a metaphor for the absolute form. The sun is not sight, but the author
of sight that is recognized by sight. The eye could see things because the sun shed light on them.
The soul is like the eye, it could “see” the truth when the truth is illuminated by the idea of the
absolute form. In this way, just as the sun is the author of sight who is recognized by sight, the
absolute form is the author of the many and is recognized by the many. We can see things in
nature not only because we have sight but also because the sun sheds light on objects. Hence, the
sun is not sight but begets sight. Similarly, truth is only known when it is illuminated by the idea
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of good, and one must perceive it through intelligence, i.e. the eye of the contrast If we only see
the appearance of objects through our physical eyes, we do not access the truth. Furthermore,
Plato adds that, just as the sun is not only the author of visibility in all visible things but also
gives generation, nourishment, and growth to objects, good is not only the author of knowledge
to all things known but of their being and essence. He emphasizes that the sun by itself is not
generation but gives rise to generation, and similarly, the good is not essence but far exceeds the
latter in dignity and power.
Notice that for Plato, both good and beauty are the absolute forms of “the sensible
many”. Hence, just as good gives essence to all good things, beauty gives rise to the essence and
beings of the many beautiful. The tangible beautiful things are reminders of absolute beauty: by
seeing and hearing them, we are reminded of the existence of their absolute form, which by itself
cannot be sensed by any means. In other words, absolute beauty is like a mathematical fact:
purely abstract and one can never access it through senses.
Now we have the ideal absolute beauty and the sensible beautiful things; the former is
known but not seen, and the latter is seen but not known. In this way, it seems that Plato would
agree that everything beautiful shares a single essence that is the cause of them being beautiful.
Without that essence, the beautiful thing would lose its beauty. Hence, it seems that the concept
of beauty could be detached from its sensible manifestations since it by itself gives the beautiful
things the essence. If a gorgeous dress looks beautiful, Plato would say that it is because the
dress possesses the essence of beauty, and this essence is exactly the same thing as that that
makes a piece of Schubert’s serenade beautiful. The same essence could be applied to natural
splendor, an impressionism painting, a short poem, a young girl…… In this way, the platonic
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concept of beauty provides a model in which the abstract notion of beauty is separated from
beautiful things. The absolute beauty could be detached from the things on which it manifests
itself, and the philosophic question that he makes about beauty would be “what is absolute
beauty” or “what is it that makes every beautiful thing beautiful”, instead of “what are the things
that are beautiful”.
On the other hand, if we recall our experience of knowing the idea of beauty and being
drawn to beauty naturally, it seems that the former comes later than the latter. In other words, the
cognition of the absolute form does not come before the experience of seeing and hearing the
tangible beautiful things. That is, one is not born with the comprehension of this notion and finds
beautiful things by identifying the essence of beauty in them. A three-year-old child might be
drawn by the beauty of a rainbow or a flower, but it is not that she finds that they bear the
essence of beauty and then becomes drawn by these objects. The child might not even know
what the concept of beauty is, but she is drawn by the flower’s beauty in a similar way just as
those who are conscious of the platonic conception of beauty. In this way, it seems that the
platonic essentialistic view of beauty does not fill in the gap between the form of beauty and its
sensible manifestations. Our experience seems to indicate that the conception of beauty rises
after having seen and heard beautiful things, and the process of the cognition of the concept of
beauty seems to be gradual rather than immediate. If true beauty, as Plato argues, is a superior
absolute form that exists as an idea, then it seems that such an idea is not “implanted” in
everyone’s mind at first hand. While a scholar could explain the beauty of a Greek tragedy by
analyzing the overall structure, the plot, and the scale of the drama, a three-year-old child who is
drawn by the beautiful flowers would not be able to “see” such beauty in the tragedy; neither
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could she identify the common properties of beauty in tragedy according to her experience of
seeing beautiful flowers. Hence, the process of gaining experience of seeing and studying
various beautiful things seems to be necessary for the comprehension of beauty as a general
abstract idea. Without paying attention to particular cases such as a beautiful rainbow, a beautiful
song, a beautiful work of art, etc., it is almost impossible to form a platonic concept of beauty.
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Section 2. Aristotle on beauty and its relationship with the particulars
In the Poetics, Aristotle argues that the general idea of something comes from particular
experiences. In the accumulation of the particular cases, the general concept of a certain thing is
gradually formed. Moreover, he also acknowledges the role of sensations in the cognition of
beauty. Unlike Plato that despises particular cases and various sensations that link beautiful
objects and people, Aristotle gives credit to sensations and argues about their importance in the
perception of beauty. He says,
“Any beautiful object, whether a living organism or any other entity composed of parts,
must not only possess those parts in proper order, but its magnitude also should not be
arbitrary; beauty consists in magnitude as well as order.”4
Magnitude, as Aristotle explains, is a certain scale that can be readily taken in at one view. If the
magnitude of a certain object is too large, the observer could not grasp the object at one time, and
therefore the sense of unity and wholeness of the object would be lost. In other words, the
observer would not be able to comprehend the object in one time if the object is beyond the
perception limit. For example, if a piece of music is so long that it would take one month to
listen to all of it, the listener would lose the general idea of the piece. They might forget what the
melody, in the beginning, sounds like when they get to half of the piece, and hence the rest of the
piece might lose the connection with the first half in the minds of the listeners. That is, the whole
piece would take too much effort to be apprehended as a complete and unified object, and
therefore people would not find it beautiful as an entity. Beethoven’s Symphony No.9 is much
longer than the symphonies before his time, but it is of a certain scale that the audience would be
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able to grasp and regard it as an entity rather than scattered music phrases and motives. Although
the time duration of this symphony is relatively longer, the audience still could perceive it as a
unified object and see the inner relationship between the beginning, development, and ending.
Thus, it could be perceived as beautiful only if it fits the perception limit. On the other hand,
according to Aristotle, if the object is too small, the duration of perceiving time would be too
short, and the observers would become confused because they could not even see what the object
is like before it finishes presenting itself. Examples could be drawn from objects that are just too
small or short that people could not even see or hear. Because such objects could not even justly
present themselves to people, there is no way for them to be regarded as beautiful objects. Thus,
if something is beautiful, it should possess an appropriate scale that fits the limit of perception of
the observers so that it is a complete object in the mind of the audience; people could then
analyze and study it according to what they have seen and heard.
Furthermore, as Aristotle writes, he argues that the plots of a tragedy must be arranged in
a certain rational order so that they are unified. The components of a work of art with smaller
inner parts must not be scattered and random; they should be structured organically so that one is
connected to the other and the sum of them is a unified object. Unlike philosophy, in Aristotle’s
view, poetry does not speak out the universal truths directly; it deals with particular individuals
and particular matters. In this way, the relationship between each particular becomes very
important; the sum of them has to render a sense of unity and completion so that each particular
is meaningful and holds a necessary place in the whole story. Hence, a good tragedy consists of
particular events with an arranged order, and this order connects the particular sequence of
events with a necessary or probable relation. The particular events follow one another in a logical
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and possible way. In this way, there is a universality behind the integration of the particulars. As
he says,
“It is also clear from what has been said that the function of the poet is not to say what
has happened, but to say the kind of thing that would happen, i.e. what is possible in
accordance with probability or necessity.”5
The relationship between the components must be probable or necessary so that one follows
another in a way that could be understood; no plot of a tragedy stands out in the sequence of
plots due to its absurdity or unconformity. Only with such a connection between the components,
the whole object could be regarded as an entity. For example, if we have two plots: “I eat a
hamburger” and “I draw a portrait of my friend”. Both plots have “I” as the protagonist, but they
are not connected logically. The second does not necessarily follow the first, and the audience
does not know how they are related. There are hundreds of ways to link them together, but they
by themselves do not form a unified story. We need more plots in between to explain why these
two are connected so that the story can be grasped as a whole. Hence, the story might go like
this: I’m an art student in college; my good friend’s birthday is coming soon, but I don’t know
yet what I should give him as his birthday gift. Today as I ate a hamburger in a cafeteria, I saw a
cartoon figure on the wrapping paper of the hamburger. That figure immediately reminded me of
that friend, so I wanted to draw a portrait of my friend in a similar outfit to the figure as his
birthday gift. In this way, because of the logic that runs through the sequence of events, each plot
is linked to the other. The audience could see why and how one plot follows another, and the

5

Aristotle, Poetics, 51a

13

entire story is therefore the integration of all the smaller plots. If any plot is left out, the story
would become incomplete and illogical.
Therefore, although poetry does not speak out the universal truth in the way that
philosophy does, it could still attain knowledge and reveal truths by showing the necessary and
probable relationships between particular events. In other words, it indirectly “speaks out” the
universal truth. Because of this, Aristotle thinks that poetry also has a philosophical aspect, and
in this way he regards it to be superior to history. He says that poetry is different from history in
that it says what would happen instead of what has happened. Because history says everything
that has happened before without considering whether one event necessarily relates to the other,
all of the events cannot form a unity as they might be fluky and disordered. In comparison, the
particular events in poetry are ordered by a certain logic. This logic makes it possible for the
audience to see the universal truth behind the sequence of particular events. Although a single
event does not stand for the universal truth, the arrangement of the events that make each event’s
position necessary, and this necessity is what is in accordance with philosophy. For example, the
reason that the beginning plots are put at the beginning of the story is not random, it is because it
gives context for the following plots to emerge, and there are no necessary plots prior to it that
the audience must know--it by itself is sufficient to be a starting point. As we see more and more
plots and the relation between these plots, we gradually comprehend the drama as a unity. Each
plot makes a clear effect on the whole, and the whole is an organic entity that is made up of a lot
of integral parts. By grasping the necessary relationship between each particular event, we see
how things would evolve according to the necessity, and therefore attain the knowledge of the
universal truth. In terms of comprehending the concept of beauty, particular cases become
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important in Aristotle’s view. We approach absolute beauty as we see and hear more and more
beautiful flowers, sculptures, paintings, music, natural landscapes, etc. In this way, instead of
holding a despised attitude to the things that can be directly sensed through our organs, Aristotle
points out these tangible objects’ indispensable role in the cognition of the concept of beauty.
Therefore, Aristotle responds to Plato’s essentialism in two ways. The first is that
Aristotle regards sensation as a necessary factor in the process of acquiring knowledge. As he
points out, beauty consists of magnitude as well as order. One must utilize various senses to
perceive the object in order to judge the scale and the inner order of the object. If the scale of the
object is beyond the perception limit, there is no way for the observer to decide if the object is
beautiful at all. The second is that Aristotle thinks that the way people acquire knowledge of
beauty is by knowing the particular beautiful things first: through the accumulated experience of
knowing the particulars, absolute beauty is gradually comprehended by people thereby.
Aristotle’s model of acquiring knowledge is, then, a reversal of the platonic essentialism.
As Plato argues that the absolute form begets the many, Aristotle points out that we must start
from the particulars to attain the universal truth. Beauty, in Plato’s view, is an abstract idea that
stays aloof from sensible many beautiful things. The absolute form of beauty begets the essence
of beauty, and the object is regarded to be beautiful with this essence. The absolute form of
beauty could only be “perceived” by the mind with no aid of the organs of senses. In this way,
Aristotle bridges the gap between the superior absolute form of beauty and the tangible beautiful
things. He points out the necessary role of sense in the process of generating the absolute and
abstract idea of beauty: seeing and hearing many objects is an indispensable process of acquiring
the more general idea of beauty. The absolute form of beauty does not establish itself without the
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previous experience of seeing and hearing beautiful things. It is through these sensory
experiences that people come to grasp the notion of beauty.
On the other hand, despite that Aristotle argues against Plato’s mode of acquiring
knowledge and points out the importance of sensation in the cognition of beauty, it seems that he
would agree with Plato that beauty is a kind of property that exists within all beautiful things,
and that absolute beauty (or the concept of beauty, in Aristotle’s words) is superior to its tangible
manifestations. For both Plato and Aristotle, if a dress appears to be beautiful, it is because this
dress has the property of beauty within it, and this property is the exact same thing as what
makes a piece of nocturne beautiful. Because Aristotle is in agreement with Plato that there is an
ultimate idea of a certain thing, i.e. knowing the truth of something, he would agree with Plato
that the truth of beauty is absolute beauty that gives essence to its tangible manifestations.
However, the term “essence of beauty” seems to give us no information about the object
of judgment. Recalling our experience of seeing the magnificent sunset, watching a touching
tragedy, listening to a sad song, and reading a lovely poem: all of these objects arouse the idea of
beauty in our minds, yet it seems that none is similar to the other. If absolute beauty endows the
essence to each beautiful thing, then there must be something in common to all the beautiful
things. Nevertheless, our experience seems to show that beautiful things of various kinds
demonstrate different “properties” as we gain very different visual and acoustic experiences from
them. As we cry for the characters in a tragedy, we are emphatic about their encounters. As we
listen to a quiet serenade, something complex stirs our minds. As we see snow mountains shine
under the orange light of the morning sun, a sense of sublimity and reverence is aroused…… Of
course one could say “All of them are beautiful objects to me”, but what does the word
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“beautiful” really mean here? Although it seems that we could see the binary system of the
absolute idea of beauty and its manifestations (i.e. tangible beautiful things), it turns out to be
extremely difficult to define and understand what absolute beauty is without the context of
beautiful objects presenting. If the word beautiful is used without the context of the object
presented, the interlocutor might get confused. For example, if someone says to his friend “I see
a very beautiful thing today!” The friend might ask “What is it?” If the person insists on saying
“A beautiful thing—you know what a beautiful thing is”, his friend might just get confused and
mad for there are so many beautiful things out there one might encounter. In this way, it seems
that the word “beautiful” is a very general description, and for different objects, it implies
different feelings and aesthetic experiences. The contents of various beautiful objects could be
totally different yet they could all be described as “beautiful”. In other words, what Plato and
Aristotle regard to be the highest and ultimate form of beauty—absolute beauty—seems merely
like a name of an abstract idea that could not be articulated: you know its existence but you could
hardly know what exactly it is. This inarticulability makes people question if such a common
property really exists within all beautiful things since there does not seem to be any property that
is shared by all the beautiful things.

17

Section 3. Hutcheson on the Internal Senses
In An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, Francis Hutcheson
explains the relation between the power of the mind that perceives the impression of beauty and
the property in objects that gives rise to such an impression. Hutcheson first explains that all the
experiences that men receive from external objects are necessary. He writes,
“Those Ideas which are rais’d in the Mind upon the presence of external Objects, and
their acting upon our Bodys, are call’d Sensations. We find that the Mind in such Cases is
passive, and has not Power directly to prevent the Perception or Idea, or to vary it at its
Reception, as long as we continue our Bodys in a state fit to be acted upon by the external
Object.”6
No matter how much the will wants to alter the experience according to the preferential or
logical decision, the sensory experience remains the same. The experience is eventually passive
and immediate regardless of willpower and logic. Whatever pain or pleasure is occasioned by the
object, the mind could only passively receive such information. Hutcheson writes that such a
phenomenon is “natural” because things naturally please or displease people no matter how we
want them to be. A harmonious chord simply pleases our ears more than a dissonant chord (and
this is also why we call them harmonious or dissonant); our eyes find more comfort in soft and
relatively low saturated colors instead of colors of strong contrast and saturation. Even if
someone might want to push themselves to not dislike a kind of stinky herb for the sake of taking
herbal medicine, the scent still causes discomfort when first smelled. Thus, the sensory
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experience and the corresponding like/dislike are inevitable and immediate, it does not change
according to volition.
In this way, Hutcheson brings in the analogy of aesthetic experience and sensory
experience. He contends that both the experience of organs and the experience of beauty are
necessary and immediate. Just as the tangible objects affect our organs of sense and give various
sensory experiences, the less tangible objects could also “manipulate” our less-known
sense--what he calls the Internal Sense. He says,
“It is plain from Experience, that many Men have in the common meaning, the Sense of
Seeing and Hearing perfect enough; they perceive all the simple Ideas
separately……they distinguish them from each other, such as one Colour from another,
either quite different, or the stronger or fainter of the same Colour……they can tell in
separate Notes, the higher, lower, sharper or flatter, when separately sounded; in Figures
they discern the Length, Breadth, Wideness of each Line, Surface, Angle; and may be as
capable of hearing and seeing at great distances as any men whatsoever: And yet perhaps
they shall find no Pleasure in Musical Compositions, in Painting, Architecture, natural
Landskip; or but a very weak one in comparison of what others enjoy from the same
Objects.”7
If beauty is perceived by people, there must be some power of perception that receives
the idea of beauty in objects. The receiver of beauty must also have some special capacity in
order to perceive beauty. One immediately receives aesthetic comfort or discomfort within a
certain object, and this experience could not be changed by one’s knowledge or willpower. If we
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recall our experience of “making” a judgment of beauty, it indeed seems that our volition does
not intervene in the judgment. A beautiful flower and a colored cloud naturally please us, a house
with rectangular windows naturally satisfies us more compared to one with trapezoid windows,
and a peaceful and glittering lake also brings more comfort than a roaring sea beneath the
storm…… We could suspect such an aesthetic response and question its causation, but merely
trying to alter such a response is ineffective to what we perceive from these objects. Hence,
Hutcheson argues, the aesthetic experience is similar to the sensory experience in that it is
necessary and immediate: it does not change according to the will of people.
Unlike Plato and Aristotle that focus on the objective aspect of beauty, concerning the
essence and the abstract idea of beauty, Hutcheson shifts the attention to the internal side. He
argues that the perception of beauty is a two-way process: it requires not only the objects
possessing certain properties that could occasion ideas of beauty in the mind of the beholders but
also a power of perception for the perceiver so that the idea of beauty could be aroused by certain
properties. In other words, the mind must be able to perceive beauty to detect beauty within the
beautiful objects. Even though some people can have great sight and hearing, this does not
necessarily mean that they can “see” and “hear” as much beauty within a painting and a piece of
classical music as a real art lover. Hence, Hutcheson contends that the Internal Sense is distinct
from the senses of organs (i.e.. sight, hearing, smell, touch, taste) that we are familiar with. It
relies on the capacity of the mind and would “resonate” with the beautiful objects so that the
mind beholder would sense the beauty of the objects. He adds,
“Had we no such Sense of Beauty and Harmony; Houses, Gardens, Dress, Equipage,
might have been recommended to us as convenient, fruitful, warm, easy; but never as
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beautiful: And in Faces I see nothing which could please us, but Liveliness of Colour,
and Smoothness of Surface…”8
In this way, Hutcheson points out the vital aspect of beauty: it not only depends on the features
and appearance of objectivity, but it also relies on the capacity of the mind that receives the
impressions of beauty. Without such a Sense that allows people to be moved by certain properties
of beautiful objects, men would not even be able to have the idea of beauty and sense it within
objects. Although the perception of beauty starts from seeing or hearing tangible objects, this
does not mean that the perceptual capacity of beauty could be reduced to bodily sensations: good
senses of organs would not directly lead to good senses of beauty. The power of receiving the
impressions of beauty and harmony thus is a prerequisite for the mind to “see” and “hear” beauty
in the external objects. Therefore, Hutcheson brings the understanding of beauty a big step closer
to the mind based on Aristotle’s view. While Aristotle argues that the very idea of beauty is
grasped gradually from particular beautiful things, Hutcheson asserts that the mind must possess
a special sense so that beauty could be taken in by the beholder. If beautiful things, as Plato
argues, is beautiful because they share the essence of beauty that is endowed by absolute
beauty--the abstract and ultimate form of beauty, then Hutcheson argues back reasonably that the
mind must also be able to respond to such essence to have beauty be comprehended by the
beholder. In other words, Hutcheson seems to say that even though the idea of absolute beauty
could be something abstract and exclusive to intelligence, what really touches people and stirs
the mind is actually the tangible objects themselves. Instead of responding to the abstract idea of
absolute beauty when making an aesthetic judgment, the reaction to beautiful things is actually
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the response of the Internal Sense that is aroused by the impressions of beauty and harmony.
Hutcheson seems to alert people that we must also pay attention to the perceptual aspect of
beauty if we want to understand beauty: there is not only the “presenting” side but also the
“receiving” side. Just as Auguste Rodin’s famous saying goes: “Beauty is everywhere. It is not
that she is lacking to our eyes, but our eyes which fail to perceive her.” The mind must possess a
certain perceptual power in order to detect beauty within objects, otherwise, people would
remain indifferent to beautiful and ugly things despite the sensory experience they provide.
Furthermore, it is also important to note that, while Plato contends that absolute beauty is
exclusive to intelligence, negating the possibility of accessing absolute beauty through various
senses, Hutcheson argues that the increase of knowledge would by no means lead to the
perception of the beauty of a certain object; one can know and study the properties of an object,
but this knowledge does not increase the perception of the beauty of the object. As he says,
“This superior power of perception is justly called a Sense, because of its Affinity to the
other Senses in this, that the Pleasure does not arise from any Knowledge of Principles,
Proportions, Causes, or of the Usefulness of the Object; but strikes us at first with the
Idea of Beauty: nor does the most accurate Knowledge increase this Pleasure of Beauty,
however it may super-add a distinct rational Pleasure from prospects of Advantage, or
from the Increase of Knowledge.”9
No matter how the Internal Sense is different from the senses of organs, it is still a sense and
remains ineffective to the intelligence and knowledge. This explains why a poet, who does not
have as much knowledge of a tree and a flower as a scientist, could “see” so much beauty within
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the natural object and compose a poem for it. Just as knowledge would not add up to the senses
of organs, e.g. knowing what the peacock’s feather looks like in detail would not help one sees a
peacock in distance better, the Internal Sense, like sight, would not be affected by knowledge of
objects either.
In this way, Hutcheson fills the gap between intelligence and sensations as well as their
corresponding concepts--absolute beauty and tangible beautiful things. While agreeing with
Plato that beauty is not accessible to mere senses of organs, Hutcheson points out that it is not
accessible to intelligence either. By contemplating upon a certain object or studying more about
it would not help one perceive its beauty better.
Hutcheson thus reasonably proceeds to his discussion on the occasion of ideas of beauty
and harmony, that is, what quality in the objects gives rise to such ideas. He directly proclaims
that the idea of beauty in the object is raised by a compound ratio of Uniformity amidst Variety.
He says, “...what we call Beautiful in Objects, to speak in the Mathematical Style, seems to be in
a compound Ratio of Uniformity and Variety: so that where the Uniformity of Bodys is equal,
the Beauty is as the Variety; and where the Variety is equal, the Beauty is as the Uniformity.”10
He then explains this “formula” in two ways. First, the Variety increases the Beauty in equal
Uniformity. For example, in the universe, the uniformity is the immense dark empty space; the
beauty of the universe increases as stars and galaxies of different colors scattered around the
empty space. Second, Hutcheson adds, the greater Uniformity increases the Beauty amidst equal
Variety. The movement of tides is a good instance here. We see waves of different shapes,
speeds, sizes on the ocean; none is the same as the other, yet they all move toward the same
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direction and there is a general sense of uniform rhythm amidst these different movements. So,
despite that we can never see waves moving in the same size and shape, we see their beauty
through the more general uniform rhythm behind such a variety. If we recall our experience of
seeing the movement of streams, wind (as it manifests itself on trees), bonfire, clouds, blooming
flowers, etc., it seems that these natural objects that give an impression of beauty and harmony
all display a kind of Uniformity amidst Variety in their appearances and movements. On the one
hand, if all flowers and trees look the same, and if all the stars in the universe line up neatly,
nature would be too boring and lifeless. On the other hand, imaging seeing a field of flowers
with too many colors and are of bizarrely different sizes and shapes, harmony and beauty would
not be sensed. In this way, the formula of beauty that Hutcheson brings in seems to be quite
compelling: too much uniform is dull and lifeless, and yet too much variety would disturb our
eyes. Hence, the formula Uniformity amidst Variety is what incites the Internal Sense and
occasions the idea of beauty and harmony. While the external senses perceive the physical
properties of objects (e.g. coldness, softness, smell, etc.), the Internal sense perceives a more
complex relationship between these properties and reveals their order and arrangement to the
mind. This sense allows people to find harmony and beauty from the complex and variegated
sensory experience.
Therefore, as Hutcheson writes in the previous passage,
“The only Pleasure of Sense, which our Philosophers seem to consider, is that which
accompanys the simple Ideas of Sensation: But there are vastly greater Pleasures in
those complex Ideas of Objects, which obtain the Names of Beautiful, Regular,
Harmonious. Thus every one acknowledges he is more delighted with a fine Face, a
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just Picture, than with the View of any one Colour, were it as strong and lively as
possible”11
The Internal Sense holds two features according to him. First, what incites the idea of beauty is a
rather complex and abstract inner relation between the properties of a certain object; as the mind
extract the complex inner relations into a more ordered overall perception--Uniformity amidst
Variety, the Internal Sense is incited, and it links people and the objects together through the idea
of beauty and harmony thereafter. Second, the idea of beauty and harmony is immediate and
necessary, it strikes the mind directly without the beholder’s intelligent intervene. Whatever
volition or decision could not impact the aesthetic experience one receives. Therefore, we come
to see that the Internal Sense is both internal and “sensory”. It is different from the external
senses in a way that it perceives a higher relation between the properties of external objects, yet
it is also a sense that preferential and logical decision remains ineffective to it.
Regarding the inner relation between the properties of the object, it might be reminiscent
of Aristotle’s writing on magnitude and order. Like Hutcheson, Aristotle also points out that
there must be some common features of all beautiful things, and such features are about the inner
relation of the components of the object. If the object is an organic entity that is made up of
many integral parts that are arranged by a necessary logical sequence, the object is a beautiful
one. However, Hutcheson extends this view to a more abstract and comprehensive level. On the
one hand, he proceeds Aristotle’s discussion on the external side, suggesting that the external
objects must possess certain qualities so that they can arouse the aesthetic response within
people. On the other hand, Hutcheson brings forward that beauty is not knowledge that could be
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learnt through accumulative experience. It resides in the connection between the external objects
and the Internal Sense. According to him, the aesthetic experience is eventually a response of the
Internal Sense to the objects that are capable of inciting the Internal Sense.
If we take a look at fashion, a media of beautiful garments where the concept of beauty
manifests itself in dramatically different ways, we might be able to understand Hutcheson’s
formula Uniformity amidst Variety better. Although clothing is essentially a practical thing that
was invented for the sake of keeping the body warm, protecting the body from rough surfaces
and insect bites, etc., it inevitably evolves into a media of showing people’s cultural background,
identity, social roles, and aesthetic tastes. It seems that if people did not have the Internal Sense
of beauty, clothing would not evolve into so many forms and styles since very basic wraps of the
body or simple suits could satisfy the essential and practical needs of human beings. As there are
so many different styles and patterns of garments across ages and cultures, what was accepted to
be beautiful and charming appears to be radically different. Not to mention the difference
between the medieval Catholic clothing and the traditional clothing of Japanese women, if we
only look at the late twentieth century’s fashion designs in France, we could find that the idea of
beauty could appear to be so different on various garments. It seems that these different
manifestations of beauty on clothing demonstrate Uniformity amidst Variety in a subtle way.
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Section 4. Late Twentieth Century Fashion Designs

This is a photo from Christian Dior 1998 Spring Couture Collection by John Galliano.
The model’s slightly tanned skin and the monochrome ivory of the dress contrasts with each
other, displaying a visual harmony as both of them display a warm tone. The skirt naturally
drapes at one side, creating a beautiful shape. This soft texture contrasts with the vest’s more
firm material, which enables it to remain in a relatively straighter cut, portraying the shape of the
model’s upper body. The combination of the upper body’s slim cut and the lower body’s draped
silhouette makes the whole look not too bulky or too slender. The silver heels are also very
subtle. It is beautiful by itself, but it does not grab too much attention so that it forms a
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harmonious relationship with the other components of the whole look. One could imagine that if
the model wears a pair of bright yellow or purple heels (which could be beautiful by themselves
too), the sense of harmony would not manifest itself on this look. Moreover, the proportion
between the hat and the waist displays a geometric beauty; without the large flat hat, the beauty
of the waist might not appear to be this obvious.

Here is another Galliano’s work for Dior in 1998. In the left photo, the first impression is
the bigger upper body and the slenderer lower body with a leg half exposed from the split dress.
Unlike the above one, this one has more colors and is decorated with a more complex pattern.
The color of red and blue are supposed to present a big contrast to the visual experience, but
Galliano lowers their saturation and adds a cold and white tone to both of them, making them
rosé and silver-blue. In this way, the two colors show a sense of harmony, reducing the visual
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impact of the scattered flowers. In addition, the silhouette of the robe and wide sleeves are
reminiscent of the Chinese garment in the early twentieth century. In contrast, the split dress is a
purely western European style. However, the two garments do not render any visual dissonance
or absurdity. They seem to add radiance to each other.
The same can be said to the right photo. There are more than five colors on the garment
that the model wears, but it does not create a sense of chaos or randomness--each color seems to
match the other appropriately. While the robe has an apparent oriental vibe, reminiscent of
Japanese kimono, the dress inside is pretty “western” regarding its color and low neckline
design. Once again, this combination of eastern and western creates a new visual experience and
satisfies our aesthetic eyes. The mix of colors, materials, and styles do not show a contradiction
or dissonance; on the other hand, they are such a beautiful combination that one would be
equally charming without the other.
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Similar to Dior in Galliano’s time, Elie Saab is also a fan of maximalism. This exquisite
white dress comes from Elie Saab Haute Couture 2017. The main color of the dress is also white,
but this one presents a totally different visual experience compared to the first ivory Dior suit.
The embellishment is so finely detailed that the cloth by itself is a beautiful piece of work. The
upper part of the dress is almost transparent and it seems like the embroidery is a part of the
model’s body. However, a white belt is placed on the waist as if it is telling people that the model
is actually wearing something, balancing the beautiful illusion and reality. The ornament is not
all over the dress but stays around the waistline and the sleeve, bringing people’s eyes to the
center of the body so that the dress does not seem to be too heavy. Below the embroidery are
layered diaphanous veils, under which we can see the model’s legs subtly. Moreover, the pair of
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long earrings make a clever balance: it illuminates the upper body so that it does not look too
blank compared to the fine embellishments in the waist area.

This is Ines de la Fressange in Chanel’s runway by Karl Lagerfeld. The black coat
slightly extends her shoulder, and the oversized pants makes people unable to see the shape of
her legs, both adding a spice of masculinity to the whole look. However, the layered long pearl
necklace and the adorned belt contrast with these muscular elements and add a sense of
femininity to the look, balancing the sense of masculinity out. In addition, the bagged pants, the
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slim waistline, as well as the extended shoulder line make the whole body an x-shaped look, so
even though this is not a completely feminine outfit, we could still see a beautiful shape of the
body. It is interesting to see that the lower edge of the coat is right near the waistline; in this way,
the shape of the waistline becomes partly hidden and partly visible as the model walks. This is
like telling the audience “I have a slim waist but I don’t really want to show it to you”. We could
imagine that if the coat becomes longer the visual experience would be quite different. This is
where the garment is functioning as a language.
Moreover, Fressange’s temperament also adds beauty to the whole look. It seems she and
the clothing is a unity: the garment increases her beauty and shows her special humor while the
beauty of the clothing is also presented through her. If we see the suit hung in a closet, we might
not be able to grasp its beauty as much as it is on Fressange, and Fressange would not show
equal charm if she just wears a t-shirt and a pair of jeans. It seems that the relationship between
them is almost a necessary one. Although she can change whatever clothes she would love to
wear, the photo shows a kind of inseparable relation between them to those who do not know her.
We come to know her and her charm through the suit that she wears, and we also know what
type of people is suitable for this garment by looking at this photo.
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Last by not least, Maggie Cheung walked for Hermès by Martin Margiela in 1999.
Compared to the previous garments, this one is very minimalist. The cut is by no means to
emphasize the curve of the body, and there is no contrast between the silhouette of the sweater
and the pants: both are quite loose. The color is simply black, although there are different levels
of darkness. However, the reduction of ornamentation does not lead to a reduction in overall
beauty. Although the sweater and pants might look ordinary, they seem to possess a special
beauty when Cheung wears them. In other words, the combination of Cheung and the garment
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seems to be a representation of leisureliness and comfort, which by themselves are the
manifestation of beauty and elegance.
Looking at these examples, it seems that there is not an obvious and explicit feature that
runs through all of them. Despite that each look draws our eyes by their beauty, the silhouettes,
color matching, style, ornaments, and texture are just very different. It seems that there is not a
set formula for a beautiful garment, e.g. a dress does not need to be voluminous, colorful, or
exquisitely embellished to be beautiful, it could be anything according to the designer’s thoughts
and senses. In this way, it seems that the beauty of a dress does not lie in a single feature or a set
of features, instead, it is more about the overall relation of each feature and how one contrasts or
corresponds with the other. In fact, through these examples, we may find that mere words such as
contrast, correspond, match, balance, etc. are too explicit and limited. They tell something about
the garments but could not replace the visual experience of seeing the garments. Without seeing
these pictures, we might not be able to seize the idea of how a kimono-like flowery robe could
match a golden slip dress, and how a monochrome black sweater and black pants could be
combined in a way that displays a sense of elegance and nonchalance.
On the other hand, even though one cannot extract the common features of all these
beautiful garments, it appears that they please our sense of beauty in a certain way. The contrasts
of the silhouette, the matching of colors, and the usage of embellishments and decorations are
not random and capricious. We could see that if the colors are too many, if the silhouette is too
voluminous or slim, or if the texture is rough and stiff, the dresses would not display equal
beauty as the pictures above. That is, any little change could alter our overall perception of the
beauty of these looks; each garment’s color, material, embellishment, and silhouette play an
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important role in the overall beauty of the piece. In this way, it seems that the design of clothing
is in accordance with Aristotle’s criteria of beauty: magnitude and order. The garment has to be
of a certain size that suits our perception limit, and the details of the dress must obey an order so
that each component is an integral part of the organic whole (i.e. the overall beauty of the dress).
However, while Aristotle could explicitly point out that the order of poetry works resides in the
logic and necessity of each event, it is more difficult to say what the order of a visual work is
since there is not an obvious “logic” between each visual element of a dress. In other words,
while we could sense “an aesthetic order” when we see a beautiful dress, it is not quite easy to
specify what exactly the order is because the visual elements could not display a logical
relationship with each other as the events in a tragedy do. The logic behind a sequence of events
is easier to be “translated” into language whereas the “order” of various visual elements does not.
Apparently, Hutcheson has seen this limit of Aristotle’s view on beauty, and the theory of
Internal Sense comes in right in the place to explain what the order of the visual components of a
beautiful object is. Just as he says, “...there are vastly greater Pleasures in those complex Ideas of
Objects, which obtain the Names of Beautiful, Regular, Harmonious.”12 The pleasure of beauty
comes from a higher and more complex relation between the basic features of objects, and such a
relation is usually difficult to be articulated by plain words because it is more about the sense
rather than logic and intelligence. The ivory Dior suit in the first photo is beautiful because its
tone, material, and shape display a harmonious relationship with each other, and the same could
be said to all the other pieces in the pictures above. What attracts us is not a simple color or a
special cut of the dress but an overall arrangement of them. Each garment is beautiful not only
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because of these simple visual elements but also because of that special relationship between
these elements. While Galliano’s oriental robes are quite charming, they do not go well with any
other dresses in the pictures above despite that other dresses are equivalently beautiful. We could
imagine that it is worn with the Chanel jacket and pants, it would look very bizarre. In other
words, the pieces that are beautiful by themselves might not go well with each other if the
relationship between them does not correspond with our Internal Sense. They must be in a
special relationship so that they could occasion the idea of beauty.
Furthermore, to understand Hutcheson’s argument to a further extent, it also seems that
Hutcheson’s compelling formula Uniformity amidst Variety could be applied to each of these
designs. The most obvious examples would be Elie Saab’s translucent dress and the Hèrmes
black suits. For the Saab dress, it seems that the shape of the embroidery is quite random; it is
like the shape of the vines of a certain plant: while one could find various shapes of the vines, it
seems that they distribute themselves according to a certain rule that they do not look madly
scattered. We could also say that while the color and material of the dress remain uniform, the
embroidery, as well as the swaying skirt, renders a sense of ruleless and randomness. In this way,
the dress overall conforms to Uniformity amidst Variety. Similarly, for the black Hèrmes suit, the
overall uniformity is the color and oversized silhouette. However, the contrast between the tone
of black and grey, the inverted triangular neckline of the sweater, as well as the formless empty
space between the model’s body and the garment contribute to the “variety” aspect of the outfit.
As long as the look consists of both uniformity and variety, it could be very attractive to our
eyes.
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In this way, it seems that it is very difficult to explain rules of sense by language. Even if
there are some terms and theories that are quite close such modes could only cast a certain light
on our understanding of beauty. It is neither necessary nor sufficient condition for objects to be
beautiful. In this way, one could not help but ask if there is really an explicit answer to the
question “what makes things beautiful” because we have seen that to have the idea of beauty not
only the external objects should possess certain qualities but also the perceiving mind should be
able to detect a higher relation between these qualities of the objects. On the one hand, the higher
relation seems to be so free and lawless if we recall the picture of beautiful fashion garments. It
almost seems that the designers could just assemble variegated colors, forms, patterns, and cuts
together and create a fashion piece. On the other hand, we clearly see that while the components
of a whole look match each other so well, they could not give rise to the idea of beauty if one
piece in a picture is matched with another piece in another picture. Of course one could argue
that it is possible for the ivory vest in the first Dior look or the black jacket in the fifth Chanel
look to match with other clothing and create different beautiful looks, but these other looks
would render a totally different aesthetic experience even if the same item appeared on all of
them. That is, one could take a component and utilize it to create other beautiful entities, but
these other beautiful entities, despite their beauty might be equally compelling, the aesthetic
experience of seeing entity A would be very different from seeing entity B. Hence, a beautiful
entity is beautiful and special due to the relationship between its components. Like Aristotle
says, each component must be an integral part of the whole, taking out any component would
decrease the overall beauty of the organic whole. Therefore, it seems there are some inexplicit
rules that direct our perception of beauty. Such rules are like the logic behind a sequence of
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necessary events in Greek tragedy that links all events together. The logic of fashion links the
silhouette, color, material, cut, etc. in a similar way, and each piece of beautiful clothing is like a
complete poetry work that consists of many small integral events.
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Section 5. Wittgenstein Against Essentialism
While Aristotle and Hutcheson provide a more global view to our understanding of
beauty, it seems that each particular beautiful object contains a different relationship between its
components. In other words, even if we admit that it is the higher and more complex relation of
the components of a certain object that gives rise to the impression of beauty, we still could not
ignore each object’s particularity, i.e. the unique relation that makes us feel something is
beautiful. When a piece of music strikes us, we are impressed by the piece itself, its melodies,
harmonies, rhythms, lyrics (if any), etc. The relationship between these elements is a special one,
and this specialty makes this piece a unique piece. If another piece contains a totally same
relationship between these elements, we might say that that piece is plagiarizing for it copies
what makes this piece beautiful to that piece. Similarly, when commenting on a fashion design
work, despite that the first impression of a certain piece might be “this is a beautiful dress” when
explaining this first impression, we still need to bring more attention to the special features of
this dress, e.g. its texture, silhouette, color matching, etc. Going back to the fashion design
examples above, it seems that we must describe the details of the dress in order to give a fuller
embodiment to our impression of its beauty. We say “the asymmetric drape of the skirt contrasts
with the clingy vest” and “the oversized black coat and pants add a spice of masculinity that
balances out the sense of femininity that comes from the layered pearl necklace and the adorned
belt”, to let others know what exactly makes us feel this certain dress is beautiful. Each sentence
shows several features of the dress, and words such as “contrast” and “balance” tell the
relationship between these features of the dress. From such words of description, one comes to
know what a certain garment looks like and what makes it beautiful. However, while the
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previous philosophers tend to extract a higher relationship between these features to “elaborate”
the formula of beauty, it seems that no dress displays a completely same relationship with
another. That is, even though Hutcheson shows the compelling formula Uniformity amidst
Variety to explain the occasion of beauty, we still could not see how each dress manifests this
rule along with their various features, neither do we know how this rule operates upon these
features of the garments when looking at those photos of fashion designs. Indeed, through the
Internal Sense, we could perceive a more complex pleasure within objects under the name of
harmony and beauty, but the occasion of the impression seems to be very abstract and formless.
Saying that this relation is the occasion of the idea of beauty gives not much information about
the beautiful object.
In other words, when we comment on a certain work of fashion, we are really focusing on
the individual pieces and their details. We do not think about Uniformity amidst Variety first and
then identify features of the dress that are in accordance with this formula to make an aesthetic
judgment. Indeed, if we look at many fashion design pieces at one time and compare their
different designs, they may show a kind of uniformity amidst variety. As the colors, shapes, cuts
of each garment are so different from one another, we might see a subtle uniformity amidst such
various designs, and this aesthetic experience might render an impression of beauty.
Nevertheless, such an impression is very insignificant compared to that when we look at the
individual pieces. Hence, the comprehensive formula seems very powerless in the context of
fashion designs because people really care about are the particular dresses and particular jackets.
Moreover, even though we could say “There is a special relationship between the componential
features of each beautiful dress, and it is this relationship that coordinates with the Internal Sense
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and occasions the idea of beauty”, it seems that such a relationship is too abstract to grasp.
Recalling the brief analysis of each beautiful fashion design works above, it seems that there are
so many variants or derivatives of such a relationship that we almost feel guilty by calling it a
relationship. While some features of beauty may overlap in these photos, like many outfits
demonstrate a contrast between the silhouette and overall harmony of colors, there is always
something new about beauty in a new photo. Although both the Chanel suit and the Hermès
outfit use a lot of blacks to portray a kind of elegant and unisex style, Chanel uses many jewelry
and accessories while Hermès uses just a simple black string. While the first four photos show
gorgeous femininity, the last two display a more unisex or boy-like style. We could also find both
maximalism and minimalism in those photos, and both are compellingly beautiful even though
the features that make them beautiful are totally different. While a dress can be simple and
elegant with the cut and volume displaying different characters, it can also be quite complex and
colorful with visual elements from different cultures and styles. Moreover, the garment can even
be beautiful in a way that it and its wearer show a unique relation as one becomes more beautiful
with the accompaniment of the other…... If we look at more pictures of this kind, we may find
more features of beauty in fashion designs. In one word, we can never exhaust the further
explanations of the beauty of various garments. Each piece consists of different elements, and
each is composed of a different arrangement of elements. Therefore, it seems that the occasion of
beauty is neither a single property nor a concrete special arrangement of the components of the
beautiful objects. Different beautiful things possess different features and arrangements of
features for them to be beautiful. While some beautiful things have similar features that make
them beautiful in common, some may not.
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In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein brings a new way to think about definitions
of words when he talks about the plurality of language. If we apply this mode of thinking to the
definition of beauty, we might have a different view on the concept of beauty. Wittgenstein
argues that, instead of having one essential common feature that works for all things under the
same name, many things are “defined” by a series of overlapping similarities, where no single
feature or a set of features is common to all. He says,
“Instead of producing something common to all that we call language, I am saying that
these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us use the same word for
all— but that they are related to one another in many different ways. And it is because of
this relationship, or these relationships, that we call them all "language".13
He uses the word “game” as an example. He argues that it is impossible to form a clear-cut
definition for game because when we use this word in different contexts it has very different
meanings. We can find some common features of its meanings in card games, sports games,
board games, and children’s games, but it seems that there is not a single feature that is common
to them all. Although some of them share a common feature, this feature disappears when the
word is used in other contexts. For example, for both card games and sports games, there is a
competitive aspect involved; whereas in other contexts such as children’s games or makeup
games, the meaning for competition disappears. Similarly, for children’s games and card games,
there is a sense of entertainment involved, suggesting that the game players use the game as a
way of entertaining themselves, and such games are meant to bring fun to people. However, in
sports games, the significance of this entertaining aspect lowers much more for the athletes are
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not meant to entertain themselves when they spend much energy and time to prepare for the
Olympic “Games”. In this way, the definition of game is basically “a complicated network of
similarities overlapping and criss-crossing”14. One could not find an absolute definition for it
regarding how its meaning changes in these different situations. In addition, if we think about the
verb of games, i.e. to play, it seems that this word also consists of various meanings with one
overlap another. It could mean to participate, to perform, to compete, to have fun, etc., depending
on the context. There does not seem to be any sentence or a set of features that could summarize
the usages of the word.
Wittgenstein uses “family resemblances” as an analogy to the relationship between these
similarities: just as members of a family that have various features that overlap and criss-cross
each other, the meaning of games in different contexts also form a family. In a family, the father
and the eldest son may share the features a,b, and c, the eldest son and his sister share features
b,c, and d, his sister and her cousin share c, d, and e, and the cousin and her brother may share e,
f, and g…… Eventually, the father and the cousin’s brother have nothing alike as the common
features keep dropping out, but because of the relationship between these members of the family,
people could identify them according to their features and tell that they belong to this certain
family. For the word game, there is not a feature that is common to all kinds of games. On the
other hand, we know what we are talking about when we use the word “game” because each
usage of the word in different contexts retains certain similarities with some of the others.
Reviewing our examples of the beautiful garments above, it seems that beauty, just like
games, does not have a feature that is common to its all manifestations. While some beautiful
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dresses are monochrome, other ones have various colors. As embellishment and accessories are
the most important factors that make one dress beautiful, many other dresses do not need any
accessories or embellishment to show their glamor. Some designers use clothing to emphasize
the shape of the human body, whereas some purposely avoid showing the linear aspect of the
body and reveal a kind of subtle beauty within the empty space between the body and the
garment, etc. In this way, the most embellished dress may have nothing in common with the
most minimalism sweater, but they could appear equally beautiful to the audience. We see that
these features of beauty, as well as the arrangement of features, overlap and criss-cross each
other, but we cannot identify one single feature or a set of essential features that are possessed by
all beautiful dresses. That is to say, in the realm of fashion designs, the aesthetic judgment is
usually made based on the particular features or arrangement of features of the garment. Without
seeing the particular piece of design, there is no way for one to know how it gives rise to the
impression of beauty. Even though these beautiful dresses could be viewed as in accordance with
Aristotle’s criteria of beauty (i.e. magnitude and order) and Hutcheson’s formula of beauty (i.e.
Uniformity amidst Variety), it seems that identifying them with these theories are not the
essential process in our understanding of their beauty: we do not know how these theories work
on the pieces until we actually see these pieces. That is, the theories of beauty do not come into
life without the context of usage. Only after seeing their colors, cuts, textures, and silhouettes
could we perceive a higher relationship between these features, and then could we decide
whether they conform to the philosophers’ theories of beauty. We learn what the theories mean
from each particular case because the particulars are where the general abstract ideas show their
meanings.
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Moreover, as it has been argued above, there is not one dress that displays a completely
same relationship of its features with another, meaning that the so-called higher relationship
never manifests itself in the same way. This makes us question if there is really an abstract and
more complex relationship between the basic features of the clothing that could occasion the idea
of beauty because we could never know what it means until we see the tangible manifestations of
it, and these theories work very differently on each particular garment. Hence, it seems that
saying “there is such a relationship within this dress” is no different from saying that “this is a
beautiful dress” because both sentences convey a meaning that the dress gives rise to an
impression of beauty; it is just that they express in a different way. Hence, why do we not just
directly say the latter? Instead of extracting an abstract formula that seems to work on every
beautiful object while not being able to see how the formula works on each individual before
seeing the individual pieces, focusing on the specificity of each individual seems to be a more
explicit and direct way of “explaining” its beauty because these theories work very differently in
each particular cases. Only knowing that a certain dress conforms to the theories does not give
much information about this certain dress. To comprehend it we still need to give a full-blooded
consideration of the particular objects.
In this way, it seems even if it is possible to give a very comprehensive theory of beauty
and identify its manifestations on tangible beautiful things, the theory is just too abstract and
general. While each particular beautiful thing could be very different and special, an abstract
formula of beauty turns out to be quite inadequate for the more concrete beauty seems to reside
in the particular features and the special arrangement of features of a certain beautiful thing.
Therefore, the conception of beauty might just be a large family with members of various
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features overlapping and criss-crossing each other. While some members share certain features,
some of the features may drop out in the similarity between other members. The beautiful
fashion designs above are very specific examples that show how the features of beauty may
overlap and drop out, and it seems that the same is true to beauty in other realms. If we think
about music, painting, sculpture, movie, and natural landscape, it seems that we could find
examples of so many different kinds within each realm. In music, we have medieval church
music, Baroque’s decorative pieces, lyrical songs in the Romantic period, blues, tango, and
contemporary popular music, for example. Regarding the difference in harmony, rhythm, chord
progression, the atmosphere between each genre, it is almost impossible to form an all-inclusive
and concrete formula to define beautiful music.
Hence, Wittgenstein offers a significantly different perspective to the concept of beauty,
one that is radically against the platonic essentialism. While Plato prompts people to look for the
essence of beauty, contending that absolute beauty is much superior to the tangible beautiful
things and endows essence to the latter, Wittgenstein negates such a hierarchical relationship and
points out the perplexity of the concept of beauty, suggesting that there is just not such an
essential quality that is shared by all beautiful things. The occasion of the idea of beauty and
harmony might not be a single property or a set of properties that are shared by all beautiful
things; instead, it could be a family of various features that might or might not appear on each
beautiful thing.
In the Blue and Brown Books, Wittgenstein criticizes this kind of essentialistic mode to a
further extent. He contends that our craving for generality deeply roots in our way of thinking
and prevents us from proceeding into further philosophical discussions. He says,
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“The idea that in order to get clear about the meaning of a general term one had to find
the common element in all its applications has shackled philosophical investigation; for it
has not only led to no result, but also made the philosopher dismiss as irrelevant the
concrete cases, which alone could have helped him to understand the usage of the general
term.”15
Such a craving makes people hold a contemptuous attitude toward particular cases. People tend
to think that the particulars are incomplete, insignificant, and unrepresentative because a
philosophical argument is usually about the general truth, and such a truth should be applicable
to all particular cases of its kind. If a case could not reveal the most comprehensive and
compelling aspect of a certain truth, then it fails to lead to a certain superlative and unitary
statement and should not be given much attention because it does not contribute to a
philosophical conclusion. Besides, people’s preoccupation with the scientific method also leads
to this craving for generality. Because science could explain a lot of phenomena by certain
formulas or a series of arithmetic operation, people become fond of this reductional method of
explanation, i.e. “reducing the explanation of natural phenomena to the smallest possible number
of primitive natural laws”16 for it seems that viewing these phenomena through the smallest
possible natural laws help people see the “essence” of the phenomena. Hence, readers of
philosophy and some philosophers think that a) everything could be explained in such a
reductional way, and b) philosophy should explain things in such a reductional way. If a “why”
could not be answered with a “cause” by a scientific method, then it would create discomfort to
those that ask the question.
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Nevertheless, as Wittgenstein suggests, this tendency is the real origin of metaphysics
and leads philosophers into abysmal darkness. A lot of questions are raised only because people
can add a “why” to an ordinary statement. It is a strange thing that while we do not learn and use
languages according to strict rules, we want very specific and exclusive rules of language in the
discussion of philosophy—we want an exact definition of a certain word although we do not use
it definitively. That is to say, we use many words casually in our daily lives because a simple
word could hold many different meanings in different contexts, but as soon as the context
becomes a philosophical discussion, we require the meaning of these words to be absolute and
restrictive. Wittgenstein warns us that a word has the meaning that is given by people. People
first invent a word to describe a certain thing and then confuse themselves and ask what the
meaning of the word is. In this way, we mystify the word by ourselves (e.g. what is absolute
beauty?) and raise a question that could never be answered with satisfaction. There are some
words with clearly defined meanings, as he writes, but there are also many words without.
Because of the craving for generality and the psychology forged by the reductional method in
scientific practice, we tend to think that the words without definitive meanings are defective.
However, such a feature is not a defect; we feel discomfort about their undefinable meanings
only because they do not satisfy our mentality and ways of thinking. Therefore, we keep looking
for an ultimate answer to such metaphysical questions. Wittgenstein gives an analogy to such
words without defined meanings. He says, “To think it is would be like saying that the light of
my reading lamp is no real light at all because it has no sharp boundary.”17 Hence, a meaning
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without a restrictive boundary is still a meaning; it is just that such a meaning does not satisfy
our craving.
Here one might ask reasonably: “But it seems that the response to beautiful things is still
a special one. Although the word beauty may not have an absolute meaning, it does not directly
imply that our response to beautiful things is also boundless and non-restrictive. Hence it seems
that we could investigate the response of beauty to understand the concept better.” That is, while
the external aspect of beauty could not be described in a definitive way (a conventional and
satisfying way), it still seems possible that the receiving aspect could be explained in such a way.
Even though beautiful things are numerous, our responses to them appear to be very similar and
unitary: whenever we see something beautiful, we might be touched, we shed tears for it, and we
want to extol the object if it resonates with us strongly. Despite that there are countless things
that could give rise to the impression of beauty, the response to them turns to be rather unitary
and simple. Thus, instead of focusing on the objectivity of beauty, it seems that viewing the
concept of beauty from the receiving side could also give us some information. Hence, maybe
we could ask “What aesthetic judgments mean to people?” or “What an aesthetic judgment
consists of?” to view the concept of beauty from a different perspective.
In Lectures on Aesthetics, Wittgenstein directly talks about the usage of the term beauty
in language and how it helps us see the meaning of the term. He points out that saying something
is beautiful is no different from giving a facial expression or a gesture of approval. Regarding
how children learn the words “good” “fine” “great”, etc., exaggerated bodily expressions are
used to help them understand that the objects that arouse these bodily reactions are of the kind
that deserves their approval-- of the “good” kind. As the children get more and more familiar
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with the objects as well as the words that give approval to them, they would substitute their facial
expressions and gestures for words such as good and fine. In other words, it is not that the
children are taught the notion of beauty first and then learn to identify things with the property of
beauty. The cognition of the notion actually comes from various occasions and activities; only
after having these experiences could one use descriptive language. In a similar way, the word
beautiful is learned from various occasions. We start from seeing the objects that deserve our
approval; we hear the word beautiful whenever these objects present. Then we gradually learn
that we could use this word in substitution of certain expressions and gestures whenever we
make a judgment of certain things.
It therefore seems that, unlike Plato who immediately negates the importance of tangible
beautiful things and the contact with them through various sensations, Wittgenstein anchors his
discussion right in the objects of beauty (i.e. what Plato calls the many beautiful things) and our
linguistic relation with them, suggesting that the real important thing in a judgment of beauty is
the particular tangible objects themselves. He says,
“Language is a characteristic part of a large group of activities-talking, writing,
travelling on a bus, meeting a man, etc. We are concentrating, not on the words 'good' or
'beautiful', which are entirely uncharacteristic, generally just subject and predicate ('This
is beautiful'), but on the occasions on which they are said-on the enormously
complicated situation in which the aesthetic expression has a place, in which the
expression itself has almost a negligible place.”18
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Since words of approval function as a substitution for gestures of approval, they could also be
replaced by the latter. In this way, when someone says “this is beautiful'', what matters in the
sentence is not the meaning of the term “beautiful”; instead, the sentence mostly concerns a
judgment of approval, and the word “beautiful” hardly plays any role at all in an aesthetic
judgment. If we want to know more about the beautiful object we need to ask the person what it
is about the object that gives him an impression of beauty. If we recall our experience of reading
a music criticism, for example, it seems that the aesthetic adjectives hardly manifest themselves
in such passages. Compared with saying that “This chord sounds so beautiful”, a real music lover
might say “The transition from the half-diminished seventh chord to the tonic is very smooth and
satisfying.” If one only says that the chord is beautiful, others would hardly be able to know how
the chord functions and sounds like in the music passage. To know why something could
generate a pleasing experience one should consult the particular features of the thing instead of
focusing on the term “beautiful”. Moreover, if the satisfying tonic chord is put in a totally
different phrase, it could sound dramatically different and might even cause some discomfort to
the ears. That is, the beauty of this chord relies on the context and its relation to the context.
Hence, when saying that “This is a beautiful chord”, one is giving approval to the chord as it is
played within a specific context. Merely looking for any kind of property within the simple chord
could never explain the music and its listening experience.
Therefore, Wittgenstein stresses again that the idea of beauty could not be detached from
the particular beautiful objects, contending that beauty could only be cognized with the aesthetic
object presenting. More importantly, unlike Plato and many other previous philosophers that
focus on the concept of beauty itself, Wittgenstein suggests that the word “beautiful” has almost
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no place in an aesthetic judgment. Since the judgment does not come from the identification of
the determinant essence (i.e. beauty) of the object, the word beautiful functions only like a
predicate or an interjection of approval. Such an adjective tells something about the object, but
the “something” is very limited. If a person replaces such adjectives with interjections or
exaggerated facial expressions, other people who see such a reaction could still understand the
response that was made upon the object. Asking what the word beautiful means in an aesthetic
judgment is like asking what it means by “good” in the sentence “The coffee tastes good.” To
describe why it is good, instead of focusing on the meaning of the word good, one should talk
about the aroma and the acidity of the coffee, i.e. the more specific features of the particular
object. The adjective here is really just an expression of approbation; what the good or beautiful
consists of needs to be further explicated according to the particular features of the object.
Moreover, Wittgenstein goes on in the lecture and points out the secondary role of
descriptive language in aesthetic judgments and the primary role of sense. He adds that, just as
music appreciators are drilled by harmony and a generally steady rhythm, in fashion, tailors also
make their judgments upon the feeling of “correctness”. They know what a good suit would look
like on each person, so when someone tries on the suit in front of them, they could easily judge if
the sleeve or the shoulder line is too long or too short, too large or too narrow. Compared to those
who have no idea about what a good suit is supposed to look like, the tailors have a more refined
judgment about suits. Their aesthetic judgment towards various suits is more refined than
ordinary people. Such commanding of the rules, as Wittgenstein suggests, comes from the
accumulative learning of various rules. As people gain more experience in a certain field in
which aesthetic judgments are needed, they would gradually internalize the rules they have
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learned and develop a “feeling of the rules”. This feeling directs their intuition and helps them
make more refined judgments. The rules could be explicitly taught or not formulated at all, and
the commander of the rules could recognize and flexibly utilize them (e.g. in music a suspension
note should move down a degree to resolve the dissonance) or take actions that follow these rules
in an implicit way (e.g. an interior designer knows better in how to place the furniture in a
beautiful way). In other words, some rules in the aesthetic judgment could be articulated by
language and some could not. Those rules that could not be explicated by language remain a
mere feeling of correctness, but its inarticulability does not affect how it directs composers and
tailors to create beautiful pieces.
It is also important to note that, unlike Plato, Aristotle, and Hutcheson that attribute
beauty as a universally accepted thing to all human beings, Wittgenstein brings out the cultural
aspect of aesthetic judgments. He contends that people of different time and culture play totally
different aesthetics games, and therefore it would be impossible to treat the aesthetic judgments
in different cultures with the same standard. As he says,
“The words we call expressions of aesthetic judgement play a very complicated role, but
a very definite role, in what we call a culture of a period. To describe their use or to
describe what you mean by a cultured taste, you have to describe a culture. What we
now call a cultured taste perhaps didn't exist in the Middle Ages. An entirely different
game is played in different ages. What belongs to a language game is a whole culture.”19
Because people in different cultures and periods of time have different rules of sense according
to their living environments, experience, education, habits, etc., to describe a set of such rules in
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full would require describing the whole culture of a certain period. In this way, it turns out to be
an enormous job—one that is impossible to complete—to explicitly specify what the
appreciation of certain objects consists of because we need to explain the whole climate of the
culture and the time period where the appreciation lies in. Therefore, it seems that Wittgenstein
negates the possibility of the existence of universally accepted beauty by saying that “the entire
game is different''. For people in different cultures and eras, the rules of senses of beauty are
various, and thus people in different cultures and eras would have different senses of
“correctness” even regarding the same media on which beauty manifests itself. This explains
why the renaissance paintings look so different from their contemporary Chinese paintings.
Because the whole culture is different, the sense of correctness for beauty is quite different. We
therefore see different visual expressions of beauty in ancient people’s minds.

Sandro Botticelli, The Birth of Venus, around the mid 1480s
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Shen Zhou, Poetic Feeling of Fallen Flowers, 1508

Although a lot of us can perceive the beauty of both of them today, it is unlikely that a man in the
Renaissance age would give high praise to his contemporary Chinese painting. The usage of
color, lightening contrast, and space, as well as the content of the paintings,mid-1480s are
entirely different. A fifteenth-century Italian man might say that his contemporary Chinese
paintings lack a sense of space and vigorousness because there are a lot of empty spaces in the
painting; the contrast of light is also not enough, which makes the figures look very flat. Whereas
the Chinese man might say that the European paintings are too colorful and realistic, which
makes them unable to present a larger spirituality of the scene. Since little room for
communication was given at that time, people were immersed in their own culture and aesthetic
systems, and were thus unable to get into the language of beauty in other cultures.
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However, looking at the history of art in a retrospective view, it seems that the rules of
correctness do not remain unchanging within a certain culture. There were always some people
that could “create” or “discover” new rules and finally incorporate them into the general rules of
art. When some new rules were first created, they might not be accepted by the general audience,
but good works of art would stay in time, expanding people’s understanding of the notion of
beauty and modifying the rules of correctness. In this way, what was considered “ugly” at one
time could become “beautiful”, and the family of beauty keeps expanding with certain features
dropping out and certain features added in through time.
The pictures below are fashion styles of different times. Despite that both are regarded to
be beautiful garments in their own aesthetic systems, they look dramatically different and one
almost could not find any similarity between them. Such a difference suggests that the rules of
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correctness for beauty could change significantly through time.
The first picture is the portrait of Marie Antoinette, the last queen of France. Although
ordinary people at that time could not afford such luxurious garments, her taste of fashion
represents an acme of the standard of beauty (as it manifests itself on the human body) at that
time. Compared to the photo on the right, her dress and sleeves appear to be extremely
voluminous, suggesting her power and wealth. Details are refined, and the materials demonstrate
a sense of luxury and exquisiteness. The colors of the dress, blue of different degrees, gold,
white, and silver (the accessories on the upper dress) are arranged in a proportion that seems very
harmonious and comfortable. The waist is extremely narrow compared to the voluminous dress,
depicting the beauty of the curve of her body (also a sign of the explicit rules of beauty at her
time). The neckline is quite low, which was designed to show her pale beautiful shoulder and
upper bosom. The hair accessories with feathers and jewelry obviously match the dress in color
and style, with the beads twist around her finely curled hair and shine subtly. Besides, the size of
her hair and the hair accessory makes her face look fairly small, creating a balance between the
full skirt and making the whole look even more dainty.
The second picture is from Rei Kawakubo’s fashion label Comme des Garçons. The
whole sweater is black, with holes appearing in random places and exposing the white underwear
and the arm. The neckline is almost crooked, making the whole garment asymmetric. In the eyes
of Marie Antoinette and a lot of fashion critics in the 1980s, the clothing could not even be called
a garment because it just looks like a rag, even the poorest people would try to stitch the holes on
their clothing to make it look better. Moreover, the sweater is so loose and oversized that it
shows nothing about the shape of the body. Although black and white do not look bad together,
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an eighteenth-century dressmaker would say that the designer of this piece pays no attention to
the “design” of colors because no color suggests a kind of lack and meager at that time. In
addition, because of the exaggerating holes, it is difficult to tell what the sweater is made up of. It
seems that Kawakubo deliberately wants to conceal the textile so one would not be able to judge
whether or not it is made up of fine materials. This sweater might not seem to be in accordance
with the idea of beauty that most people are used to, but its designer is regarded to be one of the
most influential fashion designers throughout fashion history, and this ripped sweater is one of
the most representative works of her. It was mockingly called the “post-atomic” look when first
presented to the public in the 1980s, but the fact that today’s people do not see the holes on the
sweater as signs of ugliness and a trend of fashion is a direct reflection of this designer’s impact
on people’s sense of correctness. If we take a more detailed look at Kawakubo’s design and the
thoughts behind it, we might be able to better understand Wittgenstein’s view on the usage of the
term beauty and its relation with “a culture of a period”.
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Section 6. Kawakubo challenging the conventional idea of beauty
When talking about her own designs, Kawakubo says that she wants to remove the
impact of all the previous standards of beauty. As she said, “I never intended to start a revolution.
I only came to Paris with the intention of showing what I thought was strong and beautiful. It just
so happened that my notion was different from everybody else’s.” Although her attempt was not
to crush the existing notions of beauty, her designs truly revolutionized the contemporary thought
about beauty and its relation to clothing. Regarding her contemporary fashion designers such as
Thierry Mugler and Christian Lacroix (works of the design shown below), what Kawakubo
“thought was strong and beautiful” draws the public’s attention to fashion in another direction.

Fall-Winter 1987 Haute Couture Christian Lacroix runway
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Theirry Mulger in the 1980s

Different from her contemporary designers’ works, Kawakubo’s design seems to reveal
beauty through radically different means. Although clothing is also the media to showcase her
thoughts and understanding of beauty, she employs such a media idiosyncratically: by not using
the elements that “represent” the contemporary notion of beauty, she forces the audience to
reconsider the relationship between these elements and the possible manifestations of beauty.
Fine materials, exquisite decorations, slim cut, luxuriant jewelry, etc., elements that remind
people at Kawakubo’s time of the notion of glamour, appealingness, and beauty, are all absent in
her work. Instead, we see asymmetry, oversized, and monochrome garments that deliberately
conceal the original shape of the body.
Kawakubo calls the ragged sweater (picture shown on page 58) the “lace sweater”; she
thinks that the tears are not a sign of poverty or ugliness, but “openings that give the fabric
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another dimension”, which might be considered as another form of lace. She thinks that the
machine-made flawless and uniform garments are too boring: all are the same and not a certain
piece is special, so she uses a lot of hand-woven pieces in her works, attempting to retain the
uniqueness and seemingly imperfectness of each piece. Through the randomly placed holes on
the sweater, she builds up an interplay of different textures and shadows with the woolen
sweater, asking the audience to view these signs of “bad” and “ugly” in another way. Beauty is
no longer identical to brilliant colors, curved shapes, and refined materials. People must
reconsider what the roles of these elements are in their judgment of beauty and what beauty
could possibly mean without these elements present. If rag, irregular shapes, and imperfection
could be combined in a way that somehow renders a sense of beauty, then it seems that beauty is
not restricted to an arrangement of certain visual elements. Hence, these imperfections no longer
stand for poverty, insufficiency, or ugliness; such terms and their visual representations become
detached from these negative connotations as they could also be arranged in a way that
demonstrates a counterintuitive sense of beauty. In this way, what was regarded to be good and
beautiful became mere signs of good and beautiful, what was bad and ugly became signs of bad
and ugly. These signs are now detached from their connotations, and the terms “imperfect”
“unfinished” “torn” “feminine” become neutral without any derogatory sense. In this way,
Kawakubo transforms elements of anti-beauty into a new platform that discusses the possibility
of beauty.
When asked about these counterintuitive elements in her designs, Kawakubo says that the
concepts in traditional Japanese aesthetics such as mu (emptiness), ma (space), as well as
wabi-sabi are very important ideas for her works. The notion of mu and ma keeps inspiring her
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and drives her to create new things within the potential spaces between the traditionally fixed
idea of all kinds of binary systems. In an exhibition at the Metropolitan Museum of Art in 2017,
Kawakubo’s works were curated under the topic of “Rei Kawakubo/Comme des Garçons: Art of
the In-Between”. The exhibition investigates nine expressions of the designer’s understanding of
“in-betweenness” through her previous collections: Absence/Presence; Design/Not Design;
Fashion/ Antifashion; Model/Multiple; High/Low; Then/Now; Self/ Other; Object/Subject; and
Clothes/Not Clothes. For the designer, between each duality there is an empty space that allows
her to dwell her thoughts in. She thinks that these dualities do not come from social or cultural
impact, instead, she sees them as natural— ideas that are rooted naturally inside people’s minds
without the need to be taught. In this way, her works seek to expose the space of emptiness
between these naturally formed dualities, exploring the possibilities of resolving or dissolving
these binary systems and challenging the conventional understanding of the dichotomy.
Moreover, the lace sweater and other Kawakubo’s designs also resonate with the concept
of wabi-sabi. The term wabi-sabi suggests an acceptance of imperfectness, incompleteness, and
naturality, which by itself is quite opposed to 1980s prevailing aesthetics in the western fashion
empire that is heavily influenced by the Renaissance’s ideal beauty—symmetry, balance, and
perfection. The elements such as “broken” pieces, frayed edges, asymmetry, irregularity,
deformation, etc. that repeat on Kawakubo’s designs indicate a sense of decay and damage,
words that are usually related to negative judgments. However, for the designer, this kind of
imperfection is the real perfection. As she said, “Too much importance has been placed on slick,
polished images. I show clothes that aren’t finished and expose their construction to indicate the
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value of things that are primitive and imperfect.”20 That is, imperfection reveals the real side of
nature— nothing stays in long-last perfection. The cracked and faded objects present a certain
kind of beauty that comes from the sign of time and a harmonious relationship with nature.

The above pictures show two of Kawakubo’s designs. The first one is made of an
asymmetric loose top with tatters randomly stitching on it. The sleeves are of different sizes and
widths, one covers a small part of the upper arm and another covers two-thirds of the arm. The
hem is irregularly draped, reminding people of ancient Japanese farmer’s convenient and
practical dressing. Because the wearers’ habits, body shapes, and working conditions are
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different, every garment is unique to its owner. As time goes by, the fabric is gradually imprinted
with signs of age and usage, which also shows something about the owner, making the owner
and the garment an organic ensemble. The skirt is made of several pieces of crumpled cloth of
different shades of faded white. In the mid part, a triangle is “torn off”, and the legs of the wearer
are exposed subtly as if the skirt has been worn for years. For Kawakubo, the ageness of these
garments reveals the beauty of the patina of time as well as a harmony between nature and
human beings. The “worn and torn” garments possess a kind of beauty that the gorgeous
exquisite dresses do not have. Although they are new pieces when first created, they are made to
look “old”; the intention is to present the beauty that derives from the oldness of the piece and a
sign of nature. Moreover, the dress and the top create a balance when viewed together. One could
imagine that the whole look would lose what Kawakubo aims to create if the skirt became too
voluminous or too slim. Although the stripes and crumples look random and asymmetric, the
entity presents a sense of nature and balance. As Kawakubo said, “I’m more comfortable with
off-balance—the unbalanced and asymmetrical...… What I do is try to create a balance in the
whole, because I’m aiming at presenting the total image, not a haphazard or random world.”21
In this way, Kawakubo brings in another perspective of beauty on garments: beauty that
is not only exclusive to things that appeal to the eyes at the first hand, but a kind of more
sophisticated and subtle beauty that only manifests itself through time and the garment’s special
relationship with its owner. The signs of age show a harmonious relationship between human
beings and their living environment, unveiling the humble position of humans and their
reverence for nature.
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The second picture is from one of Kawakubo’s most famous collections Body Meets
Dress—Dress Meets Body. Kawakubo intends to blur the boundary between body and dress as
well as subject and object through this collection. Down-padded garments of stretch nylon are
used to create a swelling body, and “tumors” are added on random places on the body, making an
illusion of dress becoming body and body becoming dress. The fusion of the two objects
confuses the audience and challenges their conventional thoughts of clothing and its function.
One cannot easily tell whether it is the body or the dress that swells—if not the body, why should
the clothing add such humps to the body. This collection provocatively subverts the ideal
beautiful body (slim waist, flat abdomen, etc.) as if saying “Hey, a beautiful body could also be
humpy”.
Interestingly, however, grotesque as these designs are, they do not look extremely ugly at
the first glance. Perhaps it is because of the dreamy lighting in the photograph or the contrast
between the saturated red cloth and the dappled green background; the “humps and bumps” do
not lead to immediate discomfort—the red deformed bodies are quite weird, but “ugly” would be
too much to describe them. Kawakubo gives the “tumors” a different texture that usually appears
on refined garments; this beautiful material is used in such a counterintuitive way that one cannot
easily judge if this is beautiful or ugly. In other words, simply saying this design is beautiful or
ugly would ignore the complexity and subtlety of it. This ambiguous feeling obscures the
judgment of beauty, and it might make people ask, “What if there is a humpy kingdom where
everyone looks like this?” “What would the ideal beauty be if none of them has seen a
non-humpy body (what we call a normal body)?” An empty space between beautiful and ugly,
subject and object is thus revealed to the audience, forcing people to reconsider the complexity
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of the concept of beauty and ask them to shift their attention to the very object of judgment
instead of the meaning of the idea of beauty itself.
Kawakubo has not given a clear answer of her version of beauty throughout the
collections of Commes des Garçons because she thinks that the answer would always change and
there are always more possibilities to explore. Each of Commes des Garçons’ collections would
explore a possible answer in a different way. Her motivation is to keep creating things that have
never been seen before, prompting people to reflect on their own ideas. She would never be
content with what she has created because beauty is never a fixed concept for her, so she wants
to use her designs to explore the possibilities of such a concept, making clothing not only a
media that carries the conventional idea of beauty but an entirely different platform that
questions the possibility of beauty as well as the gap between the naturally formed dualities. She
abandons the seemingly intrinsic qualities of clothing and the taken-for-granted elements of
beauty, using her works as a candid communicative tool to put the Renaissance ideal beauty into
question.
The above three examples have “explained” Kawakubo’s languages of clothing and
beauty, if not too brief. Such languages make her label not only just another fashion brand but a
vivid and strong aesthetic statement. To “express” this statement and have people understand her,
she needs and must create a new language of fashion that adapts to her thoughts and reflections.
As she said in an interview in 1998, “Deconstruction, reconstruction, etc. are words given by the
media. What I try to do in my work is to dispense with preconceived ideas (about language or
fashion, for example) and established techniques in order to create something new.”22 Just as one
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may have a subtly strange feeling when first hearing a language of a completely different
language family, the fashion designers and critics in the 1980s might also see Kawakubo’s design
as radically different and bizarre things when first seeing it. The west-dominated fashion empire
before the 1980s has built in many preconceived ideas of beauty of body and dress within
people’s minds, although not purposely. Rei Kawakubo’s entry (alongside Yohji Yamamoto,
another very influential Japanese designer who came to Paris at the same time) to Paris fashion
world questions and problematizes this taken-for-granted understanding of beauty. By not
deliberately unfollowing the established aesthetic system of fashion and dispensing with
preconceived ideas, Kawakubo creates a new language of beauty in fashion. This new language
pulls out people from the language of beauty that they are used to and forces them to see how
fixed and unconscious the ideas of beauty reside in their minds. In this way, people come to see
the limit of the taken-for-granted language of beauty and start to realize that the appreciation of
beauty is highly dependent on the culture of a period. When something that exists beyond such a
culture suddenly enters this circumstance, the people that have never seen it would find it
difficult to appreciate this new thing at first hand. However, unlike the Renaissance Italian man
and the 1500s Chinese man that could not apprehend the beauty of the paintings in other
cultures, Paris in the late twentieth century gave a room of communication and mutual learning
to the fashion critics and the designer, making it possible for Kawakubo’s designs to be
understood to a further extent.
In this way, as more and more people learn and get used to this new language of fashion,
they may understand Kawakubo’s statement from a more profound and comprehensive
perspective, that is, understand the designs “from within”. Recall the analogy of beauty and
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language, if we think of a Chinese student who has been learning English for years, the
experience of hearing an English sentence must be different from hearing it when the language
was first learned. Compared with translating English words by words into Chinese in terms of
grammar and meaning, the long-term language learning enables the learner to understand the
second language from a point that is closer to the native speaker’s. The more the learner uses the
second language, the more familiar she is with that language, and one day she might be able to
perceive English totally from a native speaker’s view because she has learned the explicit and
implicit rules of this language through her years of experience of using English. In a similar way,
as Kawakubo’s designs are appreciated and discussed by more and more people, her language of
fashion becomes increasingly prevailing and influential. Today, from avant-garde fashion
designer labels such as Maison Martin Margiela, Ann Demeulemeester, and Helmut Lang (see
their works of design on the following page) to university students’ wardrobe, Rei Kawakubo’s
breaking aesthetics has been an inspiration to all of them. We see sweaters with holes, oversized
jackets, and asymmetrical dresses appearing on people of different cultures and ages, signifying
that the concept of beautiful clothing and beautiful bodies have changed since the last century.
What people directly or indirectly learn from Kawakubo might not only be the symbols of her
unconventional designs but also a non-definitive attitude to the concept of beauty because they
have seen and learned different languages of beauty in fashion.
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Upper photos (left to right): Ann Demeulemeester 2021, Ann Demeulemeester 2017, Helmut Lang 1997
Lower photos: Maison Martin Margiela 2009, Maison Martin Margiela old collections, Margiela’s iconic
Tabi boots
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Section 7. Wittgenstein’s Thread & Fibre Analogy
Nevertheless, if the concept of beauty is a family with members of different features,
does that mean all its manifestations could coexist and are equally acknowledged by all people?
In other words, if we say the features of beauty are a, b, c, d, etc., are we indicating that these
features have an equal impact on people? Would one who thinks a, b, and c are beautiful also
agree that d, e, and f are equally beautiful? If we take cultural difference and historical evolution
into account, it seems that people in different eras and cultures would take different things to be
beautiful. Perhaps the Hermès sweater and pants on Maggie Cheung and the Chanel suit on Ines
de la Fressange would be regarded weird and ugly for people in the time when Rococo was the
dominating style. The embellished Dior ropes would probably seem bizarre and improper for the
Chinese people in 800 A.D. even though it was intended to be an imitation of the “oriental” style.
In this way, we see an inconsistency between the features in which beauty manifests itself and
the subjects that decide whether something is beautiful or not. Because of geological and
temporal differences, the features that are regarded to be beautiful may lose their charm in a
different era and culture. We see that, unlike in a family that the members may have random
features at the same time, the concept of beauty is made up of features that change evolutionally.
The new style always emerges from the last prevailing style, and it is not difficult to find
common features shared by these two styles.
The following illustrations (illustrations in the following pages) show the change of
women’s dress from 1908 to 1962. The image for each year does not speak for all trending styles
at that year, but it could be regarded as a general representation of people’s standard of beautiful
dress of that year. We can see how the standard of beauty gradually evolves as time changes.
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Every year some new elements appear and some are dropped, and one is not radically different
from the others in the close years. Without seeing the years below and just by looking at the
dressing styles, we can tell that the styles on each horizontal line are from the similar period.
However, if a 50s dress is inserted into the 10s line, it will be quite obvious that it does not fit
into the style of that time. The reason is simply that the 10s elements have been gradually
dropped out during the four decades, and new styles and features of beauty have been added.
Hence, the concept of beauty not only changes but also evolves. There is a close relationship
between the “new standard of beauty” and the old. Each new element is like a new fiber that is
added to the thread of the concept of beauty, and by looking at all the styles throughout time, we
grasp the general idea of beauty. Compared with the family resemblance analogy in which the
features of a family are more random (e.g. red hair, tall noses, and short jaws), the concept of
beauty demonstrates a progression in which each feature is closely related to another. Therefore,
it seems that the family resemblance theory may not be an accurate analogy of the concept of
beauty due to the theory’s negligence on the progressive aspect of beauty.
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In Philosophical Investigation, Wittgenstein briefly mentions another analogy in the same
chapter. He says,
“And we extend our concept ...as in spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre. And the
strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through its
whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres.” 23
That is, the overall concept is like a thread that is made of a lot of fibres; no single fibre runs
through the whole thread, but as more fibres come in and previous fibers end, all the fibres
constitute a thread. Wittgenstein himself does not make a clear distinction between the thread
analogy and the family resemblance theory, but it seems that, when it comes to the concept of
beauty, the thread analogy tells more about the term. That is, different from the concept of game,
beauty is not made up of random features. While some types of games share the feature
“entertaining”, some share the feature “competitive”, some share “involving bodily reaction”,
etc., these features do not link to each other with a temporal relationship. Beauty, however, as it
manifests itself in various styles of dresses, constitutes features that are tightly related to each
other. As the illustration shows, from 1891 to 1898, for example, all women’s dresses have puff
sleeves yet each year’s puff sleeve is different from other years’. In the line of 1922 to 1929,
while the dresses show a gradual reduction in the length of the dress, they all demonstrate a
straight cut and low-waist design……. In short, features that make up the concept of beauty in
fashion not only overlap but also evolve.
We have to admit that the trending styles is not merely a product of the changing standard
of beauty; it also reflects the change of society and ideology, (e.g. women’s bodies deserve more
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freedom). It is a misconception if we say that trending style is identical to the standard of beauty
of that time. Although some styles of dressing may be described as outdated in certain contexts,
it does not mean that this style is ugly. Women today do not dress in the way that the noble ladies
dress in the eighteenth-century court, and this does not mean that they cannot see the beauty of
the eighteenth-century dresses. However, it is not likely that a person in the eighteen-century
would find that Dior suit or the Chanel suit to be beautiful because his culture of the period has
not evolved into the language of beauty that we use today. Many styles and materials of clothing
do not come into being until the late twentieth century, and it thus makes sense that the people in
the eighteenth century could not see the beauty of the late twentieth-century fashion. Hence, it
seems that a good new design is an expansion of the people’s understanding of the general
concept of “beautiful dress”. Although the ideological and utilitarian aspects of a fashion design
make the work of design not an object of purely aesthetic judgment, good designers can
construct a new style in which beauty manifests itself within the restrain of a certain social
context. Just like Shakespeare’s works that remain classical and win high praise throughout time,
a good work of fashion design can also retain its beauty in the change of trends.
Today’s fashion design is different from ever before in a way that designers enjoy an
unprecedentedly high degree of freedom. As we can see in the illustrations, people had a very
limited standard of beauty in women's dresses in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
“Beauty”, in terms of dress, was strictly limited to slim waists, exquisite tailoring, fine materials,
harmonious colors, and delicate embellishments. The dressmakers had to make the garments
according to the rigorous rules of their customers. In comparison, nowadays fashion designers
are free to assemble all kinds of elements that appeal to them, and they can explore the notion of
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beauty through various designs. Both the customers and designers are more open to novel ideas.
Features that were popular in the 1920s could be combined with features of the 1990s, and they
together can create a 2020s piece. In other words, the notion of beauty as it appears on clothing
seems to be more descriptive rather than prescriptive in a nowadays social context. As people
have more access to different styles, they learn to appreciate different types of beauty, and it
seems that the notion of beauty gradually expands into a comprehensive term.
Nevertheless, because of this freedom, the tension between the pursuit of pure beauty and
the need for novelty emerges. Although the designers have a larger room to create things that
they regard to be beautiful, sometimes we see certain designs just do not work. Some designs
would render a feeling of incorrectness. While people are more open to novelties, it almost feels
like there is still an aesthetic rule laying inside everyone’s mind to limit the receptivity of beauty;
whatever goes beyond the receptivity appears subtly “wrong” to us. It seems that people just
have an inner sense that decides what is beautiful and what is not. Hence, it appears that, despite
the features of the objects that make them beautiful, the subjects that “take in” the beautiful
features also play an important role. Without the subject that perceives the idea, the concept of
beauty has no place to dwell in.
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Conclusion
Throughout this paper, we have examined many theories about beauty. It seems that each
philosophical investigation of beauty casts a certain light on our understanding of fashion, and
fashion also reciprocally shows some philosophical significance as we look into the details of the
spectacular designs.
Going back to the very beginning of this paper where Plato asks what absolute beauty is,
it seems that this question still holds an important place in our understanding of beauty. When we
encounter so many different beautiful things, it is almost an intuitive action to reflect upon these
beautiful things and ask what makes them capable of stirring our minds and impacting our
emotions. While the beautiful things are so diverse, the experience of beauty is very different
from any other things in nature. Compared to other experiences of living (e.g. eating, sleeping,
walking, socializing), the experience of beauty is really different in that it influences us in the
least utilitarian way, and yet we are still impressed by it and want to pursue more of it. Hence,
the inclination to learn more about it and know its absolute form is almost inevitable. We want to
know what it is about beauty that could affect us so powerfully even though the beautiful things
themselves almost do not contribute anything to our condition of existence.
Plato regards absolute beauty to be the highest and ultimate form of beauty and contends
that it gives essence to the tangible beautiful things. Such a conclusion is not ridiculous even
after seeing Wittgenstein’s radically different particularist view. Despite that Wittgenstein points
out a vital point in our learning of beauty that we should not hold a contemptuous attitude
towards particular cases, it still seems that we should not ignore the natural tendency of human
beings to find an ultimate and superlative answer. Because people are capable of reasoning and
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contemplating, they inevitably would think about the nature of a certain thing, especially when
this certain thing is highly abstract and powerful. Just as children would ask “what is a
dictionary” and “what is an airplane”, it is natural that people who are confused by the intricacy
of beauty would ask “what is beauty”. They want to learn about beauty in the same way that they
learn about a dictionary and an airplane. Therefore, Plato still holds an important position in the
cognition of beauty. He reveals human being’s most intuitive reaction towards beauty. The
platonic concept of absolute beauty is a manifestation of people’s ideal answer to the question
“What is beauty”. People want to know the nature of beauty yet are incapable of finding the
answer, so an ideal form—absolute beauty—provides a good way of thinking for this question.
Although Plato does not explicitly explain what absolute beauty is, he establishes a mode that
limits the possible answer to this question. This is like building a grand architecture without
interior designs and furniture. People could see the shape of the architecture from outside, but the
concrete answer to the question resides inside the architecture. Plato builds this architecture and
leaves room for later philosophical discussions to fill in. What the interior of the architecture
looks like depends on future philosophers’ thoughts and presumptions.
In this way, the distinction between absolute beauty and the tangible beautiful things that
Plato draws is a direct reflection of a common way that people contemplate things. Even though
absolute beauty is an idea that is too abstract and has almost no importance in aesthetic
judgments, it still represents a very important mode of thinking. A dog that has tasted delicious
food would simply want more delicious food, but it does not know that there might be the most
delicious food and want to pursue it, neither would it ask itself what the feeling delicious means
and what gives rise to the feeling of deliciousness to the tongue. However, with the mind that is
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capable of both reasoning and perceiving the impression of beauty, human beings naturally
would want to think about these questions of beauty and contemplate on the meanings of this
term as we gain more experience of it. In other words, because non-intellectual beings are not
capable of receiving the idea of beauty, perceiving beauty becomes an exclusive privilege to
human beings. When we “feel” beauty, we want to use our intelligence to know its utmost
manifestation and the occasion of it. Hence Plato is not wrong to draw the distinction between
the tangible beautiful things and the abstract idea of beauty because by doing so he differentiates
what is available to sensations and what is available to the intelligent mind. He sees this privilege
of perceiving beauty for human beings and builds a necessary relationship between it and
intelligence, and therefore he puts forward that absolute beauty could only be contemplated
through intelligence and is not accessible to various sensations.
Proceeding from Plato, Aristotle brings forward a mode of cognition that gives a
considerable place to sensations. Through the analysis of poetry works, Aristotle argues that to
know the concept of something, one starts from knowing the basic and particular cases of this
concept. It is not that we have the idea of absolute beauty in mind and then identify its essence in
various things. Instead, only after gaining the experience of the particular things that contain the
property of a certain concept could we gradually understand the more general concept. In this
way, to know absolute beauty, one has to start from seeing and hearing many different beautiful
things. As we accumulate the experience of the tangible beautiful things, the idea of beauty is
gradually formed in our minds. In this way, the many beautiful things become an indispensable
part of the cognition of the idea of beauty, and to access these beautiful things we must utilize
our sensations. Hence, what Plato is trying to get rid of in the pursuit of absolute beauty (i.e.
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sensations and particular cases) becomes the fundamental process of knowing absolute beauty.
Moreover, this view of Aristotle manifests itself again in his writings on the critic of poetry
works. He argues that beauty lies within the magnitude and order of the object. That is, a
beautiful thing must fit people’s scale of perception because an object that is too large or too
small could not exist as a unified object within people’s minds and thus could not be judged
beautiful or not. The object also must be made up of integral components so that each part
connects with the other necessarily; the components thus are organized together with a reason,
and the sum of them could render a sense of completion. Hence, to satisfy the magnitude aspect
of beauty we must use our sensations to judge, and to satisfy the order aspect we must use our
logic. Both the body and the mind participate in the judgment of beauty.
However, despite that the mode of cognition of beauty that Aristotle brings forward is a
reverse of Plato’s, it seems that Aristotle would still be in agreement with Plato regarding the
distinction between absolute beauty and many beautiful things. Although Aristotle argues that
the former comes later than the latter, he still sees the former as a necessary idea that exists as an
abstract and absolute form within people’s minds. Such a binary view still leaves the question of
“what is absolute beauty” unanswered. If we insist on this rigid dichotomy, it seems that we will
need to eternally seek the answer, which could manifest itself in a way that satisfies us.
Both Plato and Aristotle seem to regard the capability of knowing beauty as a necessary
result of human beings possessing intelligence for both of them argue the importance of logic
and reasoning in the cognition of absolute beauty. However, such a connection might not be a
casual but a coincidental one. It might just happen that human beings both possess the ability to
reason and the ability to perceive beauty.
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Hutcheson is quite right in pointing out that the power of receiving the impression of
beauty is a very different kind. As he says in his work, if people do not have such a sense of
beauty, they could never see the beauty of something even if they could have much knowledge of
it. It is not difficult to imagine some aliens from other planets with very high intelligence but no
power of perceiving beauty. They could be really good at learning and reasoning, but the lack of
a sense of beauty would never allow them to sit down in a garden and enjoy the marvelous
beauty of the flowers. While intelligence could increase knowledge through learning and
thinking, it seems that it could not operate upon the perception of beauty. In this way, the Internal
Sense (i.e. the power of receiving the impression of beauty) is a sense that it could not be
changed by any preference or logical decision. While Plato stresses the necessary relation
between reasoning and beauty, Hutcheson directly negates such a relation and brings forward a
famous formula of beauty that links the sensible aspects of the beautiful things and the idea of
beauty—Uniformity amidst Variety. He points out that beauty consists of a compound ratio of
uniformity and variety, and the ability to identify such a ratio lies in the Internal Sense. This
sense is not intelligent because logic could not intervene in the aesthetic experience; it is neither
identical to the senses of organs because those senses could not directly give rise to an
impression of beauty. Although Uniformity amidst Variety is a very abstract rule, it still appears
to be true on many beautiful things if we recall our experience of seeing the beautiful things.
Whenever we think of the dynamics of the ocean and the wind, the planetary movements, the
design of clothing patterns, arrangements of gardens, architectures, etc., it seems that the beauty
of these objects is indeed closely related to Uniformity amidst Variety. Too much variety would
make the object difficult to understand because it remains a mishmash, whereas all uniformity
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would be too boring and lifeless. We need a balance of these two to create beauty so that one
could be discerned from another.
Such a compelling rule presents us with a very comprehensive view of beauty, making us
reconsider the dynamics between order and disorder in nature. By putting forward this formula,
Hutcheson deconstructs Plato’s sacred palace where abstract beauty dwells. Instead of following
Plato’s thread of thought and trying to find the exact meaning of absolute beauty, Hutcheson
directly focuses on the occasion of the impression of beauty and gives a very compelling answer.
Such an answer brings a new insight into the understanding of beauty and shifts the attention
towards the metaphysical answer to the exploration of the possibilities of the idea of beauty. As
he writes, beauty lies in a higher and more complex relationship between the components of the
object. Therefore, Uniformity amidst Variety is an open-ended formula that could be used in
various ways, and the impression of beauty could also be occasioned by various combinations of
the features of the objects.
However, the openness of the formula also indicates an abstraction. Because it is so
comprehensive and could be applied to so many different beautiful objects, this rule by itself
does not tell much about each particular beautiful object. While it is true that we could identify
this rule from the arrangement of various elements of a certain fashion design, each design is an
idiosyncratic manifestation of the rule. The silhouette, color, pattern, and tailoring of the
garments could be arranged in so many different ways that one could not find two identical
arrangements. Although each beautiful dress is in accordance with Uniformity amidst Variety in
a certain way, the fashion critics and designers are really focusing on the details of the garments
when they make the judgment of beauty. We see that each beautiful dress renders a very different
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aesthetic experience from the other, and Uniformity amidst Variety turns out to be too general
and abstract when it comes to particular cases. In other words, the theory comes into life when it
manifests itself in particular cases.
On the other hand, as we try to find the similarities between the beautiful things, their
difference just could not be neglected because it is each individual’s particularity that makes it
beautiful in a special way. The difference between beautiful things is as important as their
similarity. Because the visual experience of each individual is so different, we could not help but
reconsider if there is really a common feature or a set of features that run through all the
beautiful things. Here Wittgenstein’s family resemblance theory comes right in place and shifts
our attention to the particularities of each object. If we allow definitions to exist without a sharp
boundary (like the light of the lamp), it seems that the definition could still work very well in our
daily use of languages. Since a general rule of beauty is too abstract and does not tell much about
the object, just focusing on the particularity of each individual and trying to find the overlapping
features between the individuals might give us more concrete information about beauty.
By bringing forward the family resemblance theory, Wittgenstein points out a very
profound problem in the conventional ways of thinking: there is always a craving for generality
and a tendency to explain things in a reductional way. Such a way of thinking leads a lot of
philosophical problems into the metaphysical abyss because a lot of questions just could not be
answered in this way. As he said, words such as beautiful and good are first used as a substitution
for gestures and facial expressions of approval. We invented these vocabularies and then want to
ask ourselves what the meanings of these terms are. Since these words are used casually in daily
languages, it does not seem possible to find a very accurate explanation for them with strict rules.
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Because the term beautiful does not give much information about the object of judgment as it is
merely an expression of approval, the descriptive language always holds a secondary place
compared to the experience and actions of the object. Wittgenstein is thus quite right by saying
that the sense of beauty is merely a sense of correctness. Reviewing the history of fashion, it
indeed seems that such a sense of correctness is different in different cultures of periods. This
discrepancy makes the languages of beauty totally different games in different eras and cultures.
Therefore, to bring in completely different fashion designs the designer must also invent a new
language of fashion.
Rei Kawakubo’s design for Commes des Garçons is an illustrative example of
Wittgenstein’s view on the sense of correctness for beauty and the linguistic aspect of beauty. As
her designs render a completely different aesthetic experience compared to the prevailing styles
in the western fashion empire in the early 1980s, she forces people at that time to reconsider the
definition and rules of fashion and beauty. Her deliberate combination of “beautiful” materials
and “ugly” shapes of body blurs the boundary of beauty and ugly, confusing people’s
taken-for-granted rules of correctness for beauty. If no such designs were presented to the public,
people might not be able to realize how preconceived the ideas of beauty are in their minds.
Without seeing these provocative designs, they might not be able to see the empty space between
the conventional duality of beauty and ugly. Hence, Kawakubo’s intention corresponds with
Wittgenstein’s thoughts that not every word’s definition needs to have a sharp boundary; what
was regarded as the opposite of a certain idea might find its way fusing into that idea.
Kawakubo’s design also reveals the beauty of a very different kind; that is, in
Wittgenstein’s words, beauty of a culture of a period. The Japanese aesthetic wabi-sabi manifests
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itself eloquently in her designs that show the beauty of a sign of age and nature, bringing in a
perspective of beauty that has never been taken into account in the Western-dominated fashion
world. This action and its result correspond, again, to Wittgenstein’s thoughts on the discrepancy
between cultures of a period. Even though both are called “beauty”, it could manifest itself in
radically different ways in the context of eastern and western cultures. What is natural to one
culture becomes radical and provocative to another. In such a communication of the two systems
of aesthetics, both sides come to see the limit of the idea of beauty that they take for granted.
What is preconceived comes to the surface and is problematized. Beauty is therefore no longer a
clear-cut definition with rigid rules restricting its possibility because all the necessity becomes a
possibility. As long as there is a general family of beauty, its members could grow and give birth
to new members. The new members might not share any similar feature with the elder members,
but this does not negate their identity as part of this family of beauty.
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